APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-35146
D.C. No. CV-97-00222-WLD

US WEST COMMUNICATIONS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MFS INTELENET, INC.; SHARON L. NELSON, CHAIRMAN; RICHARD HEMSTAD, COMMISSIONER; WILLIAM P. GILLIS, COMMISSIONER, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS COMMISSIONERS OF THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION; AND WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION, (WUTC),
Defendants-Appellees.

No. 98-35203
D.C. No. CV-97-00354-WLD

US WEST COMMUNICATIONS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TCG SEATTLE, A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; ANNE LEVINSON, CHAIRPERSON; RICHARD HEMSTAD, COMMISSIONER; WILLIAM P. GILLIS, COMMISSIONER, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS COMMISSIONERS OF THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION; AND WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court
For The Western District of Washington
William L. Dwyer, Distict Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 2, 1998—Seattle, Washington

Filed October 8, 1999

Before James R. Browning and Michael Daly Hawkins, Circuit Judges and Milton I. Shadur,[1] District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Browning.

OPINION

Browning, Circuit Judge:

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act) is designed to foster competition in local and long distance telephone markets. The local competition provisions of the Act require incumbent local exchange carriers (defined in 47 U.S.C. § 251(h)(1)) to allow other local exchange carriers access to the incumbent carrier's networks or services to enable them to compete in providing local telephone services: (1) incumbent carriers must interconnect their networks with new entrants "at any technically feasible point," and the interconnection must be "at least equal in quality" to the interconnection the incumbent carrier provides for itself, 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2); (2) incumbents must provide nondiscriminatory, unbundled access to network elements[2] in a

[1] The Honorable Milton I. Shadur, Senior United States District Judge, Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

[2] A "network element" is a facility or equipment used in the provision of telecommunications service. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(29).

sale rates, any telecommunications service an incumbent offers at retail, and permit new entrants to resell those services to end-users. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4). The Act prohibits incumbent carriers from imposing unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or limitations on the resale of the services. *See id.*

Incumbent carriers must negotiate in good faith agreements (commonly referred to as interconnection agreements) with competing carriers setting forth particular terms and conditions upon which incumbent carriers will satisfy their duties under the Act. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(1). If the parties are unable to reach agreements through good faith negotiations, a party to the negotiation may request that the state utilities commission arbitrate unresolved issues. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 252(b)(1). A state commission may impose terms by arbitration only if the terms meet the substantive requirements of section 251, including regulations implementing that section, and the pricing standards of section 252. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 252(c). After the state commission approves an interconnection agreement, a party to the agreement may bring an action in district court "to determine whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements of the Act. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6).

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued rules implementing the local competition provisions of the Act. *See In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1966*, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 (Aug. 8, 1996) (*Local Competition Order*). Suits challenging the rules were consolidated in the Eight Circuit. The Eighth Circuit vacated the pricing rules on the ground that the Act authorized state utility commissions, not the FCC, to set rates. *See Iowa Utilities Bd. v. FCC*, 120 F.3d 753, 793-800 (8th Cir. 1997). The court expressly declined to review the pricing rules on the merits. *See id.* at 800. The court also vacated non-pricing rules that required incumbent carriers to combine unbundled network elements for competing carriers, and prohibited incumbent

that required incumbent carriers to combine unbundled network elements for competing carriers, and prohibited incumbent carriers from separating already combined network elements before leasing them to competing carriers.

In relevant part, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's ruling that the FCC did not have jurisdiction to promulgate pricing rules, holding the FCC had jurisdiction to "prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public's interest to carry out the provisions of the Act," including the "jurisdiction to design a pricing methodology." *See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd.*, —— U.S. ——, 119 S. Ct. 721, 729, 733 (1999). The Supreme Court also reinstated the rule prohibiting incumbents carriers from separating already combined network elements. *See id.* at 737-38.

Procedural Background

MFS Intelenet, Inc. (MFS) and TCG Seattle (TCG), competing local exchange carriers, asked US West Communications (US West), the incumbent local exchange carrier, to negotiate an interconnection agreement. The parties were unable to resolve all issues by negotiation, and MFS and TCG requested arbitration by the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (Commission). The Commission appointed an arbitrator in each case, and arbitration hearings were held. Arbitrators' reports and decisions were filed and comments and objections received. The Commission concluded the agreements met the requirements of sections 251 and 252 of the Act, and approved them. US West challenged the Commission's decisions and asserted takings claims in district court. The district court held that the agreements complied with the Act and dismissed the taking claims as unripe. US West appealed.

Standard of Review

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. *See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Canadian Hunter*

jurisdiction upon district courts to review interconnection agreements for compliance with the Act:

> In any case in which a State commission makes a determination under this section, any party aggrieved by such determination may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court *to determine whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements of section 251 of this title and this section.*

47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) (emphasis added). We apply the same standard the district court should apply, considering de novo[3] whether the agreements are in compliance with the Act and the implementing regulations, *see Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe*, 103 F.3d 1491, 1495 (9th Cir. 1997) (a state agency's interpretation of a federal statute is considered de novo), and considering all other issues under an arbitrary and capricious standard. *See, e.g., US West Communications, Inc. v. Hix*, 986 F. Supp. 13, 19 (D. Colo. 1997) (holding that courts should apply the de novo standard to all issues involving a "determination of the [state commission's] procedural or substantive compliance 'with the requirements of the [Telecommunications Act] and its implementing regulations,' " and an arbitrary and capricious standard to all other issues). We agree with the district court that the agreements complied with the Act and the FCC regulations, and that other decisions of the Commission challenged by US West were not arbitrary and capricious. Although the district court

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[3] US West argues that we should not defer to the Commission on any of its rulings because section 252(e)(6) provides for a *private right of action* instead of an *appeal* to the district court. All district court proceedings are initiated by filing an "action" in district court. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, 2 & 3. Congress' use of this term in section 252(e)(6) does not affect the proper standard of review.

the wrong standard in its review of some of the issues,[4] the errors were harmless.[5]

Discussion

1. *Ripeness of Challenge to Interim Rates*

US West challenges several of the pricing provisions as inconsistent with pricing standards fixed by the Act. Because the challenged provisions are interim only and may be adjusted by later pricing proceedings, we conclude that these prices are therefore not ripe for review.

Federal courts must refrain from premature adjudication of agency action to avoid "entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." *Abbott Lab. v. Gardner*, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). Principles of federalism lend this doctrine additional force when a federal court is reviewing a state agency decision at an interim stage in an evolving process. *See Wright, Miller & Cooper*, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3532.1 n.16 & accompanying text (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1998).

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[4] The district court erred in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to the following issues relating to the agreements' compliance with the Act: (1) charges for number portability, *infra* at 12481; (2) inclusion of deregulated or unregulated services, *infra* at 12485; (3) inclusion of ISP-Bound Traffic, *infra* at 12486; (4) interconnection at certain points, infra at 12490; (5) combination of toll and local traffic, *infra* at 12491.

[5] The district court erred in holding that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction required substantial deference to the Commission's price determination and cost methodology. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not applicable. This is not a judicial action independent of agency proceedings. *See Cost Management Serv., Inc. v. Washington Natural Gas Co.*, 99 F.3d 937, 949 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the error was harmless.

The D.C. Circuit, which decides most petitions for review of federal agency actions, explained:

> The primary focus of the ripeness doctrine as applied to judicial review of agency action has been a prudential attempt to time review in a way that balances the petitioner's interest in prompt consideration of allegedly unlawful agency action against the agency's interest in crystallizing its policy before that policy is subjected to judicial review and the court's interests in avoiding unnecessary adjudication and in deciding issues in a concrete setting.

Mississippi Valley Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n (MVGC), 68 F.3d 503, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting *Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA*, 759 F.2d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

"In considering whether a case is ripe for review, a court must evaluate '[1] the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and [2] the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.' " *Winter v. California Med. Review, Inc.*, 900 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting *Abbott*, 387 U.S. at 149). "A claim is fit for decision if the issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged action is final." *Standard Alaska Prod. Co. v. Schaible*, 874 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1989). "To meet the hardship requirement, a litigant must show that withholding review would result in direct and immediate hardship and would entail more than possible financial loss." *Winter*, 900 F.2d at 1325 (internal quotation marks omitted).

a. *Fitness of Issues for Judicial Decision*

We conclude that US West's challenge to the interim rates is not yet fit for judicial decision. First, we cannot determine whether these rates are final since the Commission may not have reached a final decision on the rates that will be charged during the period between the effective date of the agreements and the

establishment of permanent rates. The Commission adopted a two-stage process for fixing interconnection rates: interim rates were to be set by arbitration; permanent rates were to be determined in a generic price proceeding. The generic proceeding is still underway. US West challenges the interim rates, but says its concerns would be resolved if TCG and MFS were ordered to compensate US West for any differences between the interim rates and the permanent prices, referred to as an "administrative true-up." US West apparently requested a true-up in arbitration proceedings. The arbitrators' orders cryptically provide that the rates in the agreements "will remain in effect pending the outcome of the Commission's generic pricing proceeding." The Commission's orders approving the arbitrated agreements are similarly ambiguous: "The prices contained in the Agreement are interim prices, subject to replacement by prices adopted in the Commission's generic cost and price proceeding . . . ." When asked at oral argument to clarify whether a true-up might be available, the Commission was noncommittal. Therefore, we must conclude that there is still a possibility the Commission will award a true-up at the conclusion of the generic price proceeding.

Accordingly, we avoid unnecessary adjudication by declining to review the interim prices now.[6] If a true-up is ordered, this

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[6] *Compare MVGC*, 68 F.3d at 509 (finding petition for review unripe in part because of "the possibility that MVGC will obtain relief from the effect of the [challenged] FERC orders in the pending hearings"), and *Placid Oil Co. v. FERC*, 666 F.2d 976, 981 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding petition for review unripe in part because the agency "may have been receptive" to the petitioner's argument in a subsequent proceeding), with *United Distribution Cos. v. FERC*, 88 F.3d 1105, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding petition for review ripe in part because agency had demonstrated that it did not intend to reconsider the relevant ruling or amplify its justifications for the ruling in further proceedings); *Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC*, 773 F.3d 327, 337-38 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding petition for review ripe in part because the agency informed the court that the challenged order was the agency's definitive ruling on the relevant issue: "Here the Commission states that its rule binds it to

appeal might become moot, as US West has indicated it would be satisfied with such an order. Even if the appeal does not become moot, either because the true-up is denied or because MFS or TCG appeals the award of a true-up, this court will benefit from the Commission's and the district court's legal analysis of whether a true-up is authorized by the Act and from their assessment of whether it should be imposed in these particular cases. Indeed, TCG indicated at oral argument that it may challenge the legitimacy of the generic price proceeding itself. It may assist us to have all of these legal questions presented at once, after they have been fully considered below and after the factual record has been fully developed in the generic price proceeding. *See MVGC*, 68 F.3d at 508 (concluding that the court "will benefit from deferring review until the agency's policies have crystallized and the question[s] arise[] in some more concrete and final form") (internal quotation marks omitted).

b. *Hardship to the Parties*

Delaying review of the interim rates will not impose an undue hardship on any of the parties. US West indicated at oral argument that it would not object to deferred review, as long as it may renew its appeal at the conclusion of the generic proceeding if the Commission denies a true-up. Clearly, US West may do so. *Cf. MVGC*, 68 F.3d at 509 (explaining that at the conclusion of ratemaking, the court will have "jurisdiction to review the entire proceeding").

TCG objects to continued uncertainty regarding the rates it must pay to US West, which affect the rates it charges its customers. TCG notes that it entered the local phone market and conducted business based on the approved agreements and the interim rates they fixed, and the generic proceeding may not

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accept rates calculated with CWIP in the rate base; its discretion has been exercised and no longer exists.").

conclude before the agreements expired. TCG has known, however, that the rates were subject to judicial review and might be revised in the generic proceeding, at least prospectively. Delay alone ordinarily is not a sufficient hardship to preclude a finding of unripeness. *See Pennzoil Co. v. FERC*, 645 F.2d 394, 399-400 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that mere delay is an inadequate showing of hardship, absent showing that delay will result in irreparable losses, intrusion into daily business decision-making, or the imposition of a Hobson's choice of whether to comply with a possibly invalid regulation or to violate it in order to challenge it).

Moreover, it is unclear whether declining to review the rates now will significantly delay a final resolution. At oral argument, the parties informed us that the generic proceeding was almost completed. Once it is completed, and following review in the district court, an accelerated schedule for briefing and argument can be set.

Finally, TCG and MFS do not suffer undue hardship since they might be more prejudiced by immediate review of the interim rates than by a possible true-up. It appears that the permanent prices ultimately adopted in the generic price proceeding are likely to be lower than US West's proposed prices. However, if this court in a later appeal of the generic proceeding were to determine that a TCG or MFS proposal adopted in the arbitrated agreements did not comply with the Act, one practical alternative might be to order the Commission to adopt the US West proposal in its place. Therefore, TCG and MFS may actually benefit from our decision to delay review until the conclusion of the generic proceeding.

We conclude that the possible hardship caused by deferring review is outweighed by the factors favoring deferral.

2. *Charges for Interim Number Portability*

US West argues the district court erred in affirming the interim number portability provisions in the agreements because

the assignment of costs based on the number of each exchange carrier's active local numbers violates the Act. The district court upheld the Commission's approval of the provisions because the FCC had approved the methodology. We affirm.

The Act requires US West to provide number portability, defined as the "ability of users of telecommunications services to retain, at the same location, existing telecommunications numbers without impairment of quality, reliability, or convenience when switching from one telecommunications carrier to another." 47 U.S.C. § 153(30). The Act provides that "the costs of establishing . . . number portability shall be borne by all telecommunications carriers on a competitively neutral basis *as determined by the [FCC]*." 47 U.S.C. § 251(e)(2) (emphasis added). The FCC has ruled that a mechanism assigning costs based on each exchange carrier's active local numbers is "competitively neutral." *See In re Telephone Number Portability*, 11 F.C.C.R. 8352, ¶ 135 (July 2, 1996) (*Number Portability Order*), but a mechanism requiring new entrants to bear all the costs of number portability is not. *See id.* at ¶ 138. The FCC order is not subject to collateral attack in this proceeding. The Hobbs Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to courts of appeals to determine the validity of all final orders of the FCC. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2342; 47 U.S.C. § 402(a); *see also FCC v. ITT World Communications*, 466 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1984); *Wilson v. A. H. Belo Corp.*, 87 F.3d 393, 397-400 (9th Cir. 1996). An aggrieved party may invoke this jurisdiction only by filing a petition for review of the FCC's final order in a court of appeals naming the United States as a party. *See* 28 U.S.C. §§ 2342, 2344.

US West also argues that mandatory sharing of switched access charges required by the MFS Agreement violates the Act. The district court upheld the Commission's approval of a provision requiring US West to share these charges because the Act and the FCC's Number Portability Order permit such sharing.

distance telephone calls over the local exchange carrier's networks to complete the calls. The MFS Agreement requires US West to share with MFS all access charges paid by interexchange carriers to US West, including charges for local transport, local switching, interconnection, and a common carrier line charge. US West argues it should be required to share only the common carrier line charge because MFS provides only final call termination.

The Act states the cost of establishing the number portability system must be borne by all carriers on a "competitively neutral basis." 47 U.S.C. § 251(e)(2). The FCC's *Number Portability Order* stated the "overarching principle is that the carriers are to share in the access revenues received for a ported call." Number Portability Order at ¶ 140. The *Number Portability Order* does not require that US West recover all its costs relating to number portability, but only that all carriers share the costs.

The district court correctly held that the number portability cost recovery provisions do not violate the Act.

3. *Requirement to Combine Unbundled Elements*

The district court's holding sustaining the provision in the MFS Agreement requiring US West to combine unbundled network elements at MFS's request before leasing must be affirmed under the rationale of *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd.*, —— U.S. ——, 119 S. Ct. 721, 736-38 (1999), sustaining a provision prohibiting an incumbent from separating already-combined elements before leasing.[7]

The Act states that an incumbent carrier must provide

> nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an *unbundled basis* at any technically feasible point on rates,

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[7] The MFS provision states: "USWC agrees to perform and MFS agrees to pay for the functions necessary to combine requested elements in any technically feasible manner either with other elements from [US West's] network or with elements possessed by MFS."

> terms and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory . . . . An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements *in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service.*

47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (emphasis added).

In sustaining a provision that prohibited the incumbent from separating already-combined elements before leasing, the Supreme Court held that the phrase, "on an unbundled basis," does not necessarily mean "physically separated"; an equally reasonable interpretation is that it means separately priced. *AT&T*, 119 S.Ct. at 737. The Court also held that the statutory language requiring incumbent carriers to "provide such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service" indicates that network elements may be leased in discrete parts, but "does not say, or even remotely imply, that elements must be provided only in this fashion and never in combined form." *Id.* It follows, the Court held, that the FCC regulation prohibiting an incumbent carrier from separating already-combined network elements, *see* 47 C.F.R. § 51.315(b), was not inconsistent with the Act.

It also necessarily follows from *AT&T* that requiring US West to combine unbundled network elements is not inconsistent with the Act: the MFS combination provision does not conflict with the Act because the Act does not say or imply that network elements may only be leased in discrete parts.

US West nevertheless argues that the Eighth Circuit's invalidation of the FCC regulation that required incumbent carriers to combine unbundled elements for competing carriers, *see* 47 C.F.R. § 51.315(c)-(f), requires this court to conclude that the MFS combination provision violates the Act. The Supreme Court opinion, however, undermined the Eighth Circuit's rationale for invalidating this regulation. Although the Supreme

MFS combination provision violates the Act. The Supreme Court opinion, however, undermined the Eighth Circuit's rationale for invalidating this regulation. Although the Supreme Court did not directly review the Eighth Circuit's invalidation of § 51.315(c)-(f), its interpretation of 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) demonstrates that the Eighth Circuit erred when it concluded that the regulation was inconsistent with the Act. We must follow the Supreme Court's reading of the Act despite the Eighth Circuit's prior invalidation of the nearly identical FCC regulation.

4. *Inclusion of Deregulated/Unregulated Services*

US West argues the district court erred in failing to exempt deregulated and unregulated services from the resale provisions of the MFS Agreement.

The FCC instructed the parties to examine the incumbent carrier's retail tariffs to determine which services the incumbent carrier must provide for resale. *See Local Competition Order* at ¶ 872 ("State commissions, [incumbent carriers] and resellers can determine the [telecommunications] services that an [incumbent carrier] must provide at wholesale rates *by examining that [local exchange carrier's] retail tariffs.*") (emphasis added). The *Local Competition Order,* however, only tells the parties they may examine the incumbent's retail tariffs to determine which services an incumbent carrier must provide for resale, and does not say a state commission may impose the duty to sell for resale only telecommunications services covered by the incumbent's retail tariffs. *See id.*

The plain language of the Act imposes on incumbent carriers the duty "to offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications service that the carrier provides at retail to subscribers who are not telecommunications carriers." 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c)(4)(A) (emphasis added). The plain language does not exempt unregulated and deregulated services from the statutory

definition of telecommunication services[8] or the duty to sell those services for resale. "If the intent of Congress is clear from the face of the statutory language, we must give effect to the unambiguously expressed Congressional intent." *Saipan Stevedore Co., Inc. v. Director of Workers Compensation Programs*, 133 F.3d 717, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).

We affirm the district court's decision that deregulated and unregulated telecommunication services are subject to the resale provisions.

5. *Inclusion of ISP-Bound Traffic*

US West argues the district court erred in permitting the inclusion of "ISP-Bound Traffic" (a telephone call from an end-user to the end-user's Internet Service Provider[9]) in the reciprocal compensation provisions of the MFS Agreement. The FCC has held parties are bound by interconnection agreements that include ISP-Bound Traffic in their reciprocal compensation provisions and are approved by a state commission. *See In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Tele-*

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[8] A "telecommunications service" is defined as "the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used." 47 U.S.C. § 153(46).

[9] An Internet service provider (ISP) "is an entity that provides its customers the ability to obtain on-line information through the Internet. ISPs purchase analog and digital lines from local exchange carriers to connect to their dial-in subscribers. Under one typical arrangement, an ISP customer dials a seven-digit number to reach the ISP server in the same local calling area. The ISP, in turn, combines computer processing, information storage, protocol conversion, and routing with transmission to enable users to access Internet content and services." *In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic*, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689 at ¶ 4 (Feb. 26, 1999).

communications Act of 1996: Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689 (Feb. 26, 1999) (*ISP Ruling*). Because the Commission has approved the MFS Agreement which provided reciprocal compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, we affirm.

The Act imposes a duty upon all incumbent carriers to "establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications." 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(5). The FCC concluded that the reciprocal compensation provisions applied only to "local telecommunications traffic." *Local Competition Order* at ¶ 1412. The FCC issued a declaratory ruling that "ISP-Bound Traffic is jurisdictionally mixed and appears to be largely interstate." *ISP Ruling* at ¶ 1. At first glance, the FCC's conclusion that ISP-Bound Traffic is interstate supports the exclusion of ISP-Bound Traffic from the reciprocal compensation provisions. Arguably, if ISP-Bound Traffic is interstate, it cannot also be "*local* telecommunications traffic." *Local Competition Order* at ¶ 1412 (emphasis added). However, the FCC held the existing interconnection agreements providing for reciprocal compensation of ISP-Bound Traffic were binding on the parties.[10] The FCC said:

> [Our jurisdictional] conclusion, however, does not in itself determine whether reciprocal compensation is due in any particular instance . . . . [P]arties may have agreed to reciprocal compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, or a state commission, in the exercise of its authority to arbitrate interconnection disputes under section 252 of the Act, may have imposed reciprocal compensation obligations for this traffic. In the absence, to date, of a federal rule regarding the appropriate inter-carrier compensation for this traffic,

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[10] In the ISP Ruling, the FCC gave notice of a proposed rulemaking regarding inter-carrier compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic. The obligation to pay such compensation in existing interconnection agreements could be altered by future rules promulgated by the FCC.

> *we therefore conclude that parties should be bound by their existing interconnection agreements, as interpreted by state commissions.*

ISP Ruling at ¶ 1 (emphasis added).[11]

US West may not collaterally attack the FCC's decision that parties are bound by existing interconnection agreements.[12] As noted, the Hobbs Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to courts of appeals to determine the validity of all final orders of the FCC.[13] *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2342; 47 U.S.C. § 402(a); *see also ITT World Communications*, 466 U.S. at 468-69. It is irrelevant that US West filed this action with the district court prior to the issuance

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[11] The FCC stated that the ISP Ruling "might cause some state commissions to reexamine their conclusion that reciprocal compensation is due." *ISP Ruling* at ¶ 27. Even if the Commission did reconsider its conclusion that reciprocal compensation is due under the MFS Agreement, the parties could not attack the reciprocal compensation provisions in this forum. *See Wilson v. A.H. Belo Corp.*, 87 F.3d 393, 400 (9th Cir. 1996). In fact, the Commission did reconsider its conclusion and held reciprocal compensation is due for ISP-Bound Traffic. *See Third Supplemental Order Granting WorldCom's Complaint*, 1999 WL ____ (Wash. U.T.C. May _, 1999).

[12] US West argues that the FCC "abdicated its responsibility" by finding that even though ISP-Bound Traffic is jurisdictionally interstate, parties under existing interconnection agreements approved by state commissions must pay inter-carrier compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic (if such traffic is included in the reciprocal compensation provisions). However, this argument should be made in a direct attack of the ISP Ruling. In fact, US West and other telecommunications carriers have filed such actions in the D.C. Circuit seeking direct review of the ISP Ruling. *See US West v. FCC*, No. 99-1095 (filed March 8, 1999); *Bell Atlantic v. FCC*, No. 99-1094 (D.C. Cir. filed March 8, 1999); *MCI WorldCom v. FCC*, No. 99-1097 (D.C. Cir. filed March 8, 1999).

[13] US West argues that the Hobbs Act does not apply because section 252(e)(6) of the Act grants jurisdiction to federal district courts to determine whether the interconnection agreements comply with the Act and the FCC regulations. Section 252(e)(6) does not, however, grant jurisdiction to federal district courts to review the validity of FCC regulations.

of the ISP Ruling. "Once the [ISP Ruling] became final, it divested [this court] of jurisdiction to consider the issues decided in the [ISP Ruling]." *Wilson*, 87 F.3d at 400.

We affirm the district court's decision to include ISP-Bound Traffic in MFS Agreement's reciprocal compensation provisions because the ISP Ruling requires US West and MFS to be bound by the MFS Agreement which includes ISP-Bound Traffic in its reciprocal compensation provisions.[14]

6. *Treatment of MFS Switch as a Tandem Switch*

US West argues that the district court erred in characterizing the MFS switch as a tandem switch. Both MFS and US West presented evidence in the arbitration hearing regarding the geographic area the MFS switch serves and the functions it performs. The Commission's classification of MFS's switch as a tandem switch was not arbitrary or capricious.[15] The Commission properly considered whether MFS's switch performs similar functions and serves a geographic area comparable to US West's tandem switch. *See Local Competition Order* at ¶ 1090. The Commission found that MFS's switch "is comparable in geographical scope" to US West's tandem switch, and "performs the function of aggregating traffic from widespread remote locations" as a tandem switch does.

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[14] Based on different reasoning, the Seventh Circuit also held the ISP Ruling did not prohibit a state commission from including ISP-Bound Traffic in the reciprocal compensation provisions of an interconnection agreement. *See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. WorldCom Techs.*, 179 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 1999). The Seventh Circuit held the ISP-Ruling permits state commissions to decide whether ISP Bound-Traffic should be included in the interconnection agreement's reciprocal compensation provisions "at least until the time a [federal] rule is promulgated." *Id.* at 574.

[15] We review the Commission's decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Whether MFS's switch is a tandem switch is not a determination of compliance with the requirements of the Act and its implementing regulations.

US West challenges the rates the Commission required it to pay MFS for using its tandem switch, claiming they are not "reasonable approximations" of the additional costs MFS will incur for terminating US West's calls as required by 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(2). The rates adopted by the Commission were the rates US West proposed for terminating MFS's calls. Though US West and MFS will not incur precisely the same costs for terminating the other carrier's calls, the district court held the rates were "reasonable approximations" of the additional costs incurred by MFS, and therefore complied with the Act. We affirm.

7. *Interconnection at Certain Points*

US West argues the district court erred in upholding provisions in the MFS Agreement permitting a single point of interconnection (at the tandem switch) per local access and transport area, and in upholding provisions in the TCG Agreement permitting TCG to interconnect at US West access tandem switches and at local and end office switches.

The Act requires an incumbent carrier –

> to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the local exchange carrier's network—(A) for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and exchange access; (B) *at any technically feasible point within the carrier's network.*

47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2) (emphasis added).

The plain language requires local exchange carriers to permit interconnection *at any technically feasible point* within the carrier's network. An incumbent carrier denying a request for interconnection at a particular point must prove interconnection at that point is not technically feasible. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 51.305(e). US West provided no evidence that interconnection at its tandem or local or end office switches was not technically feasible.

In any event, these regulations state that interconnection at a tandem switch is technically feasible, *see* 47 C.F.R. § 51.305(a)(2)(iii), and these regulations are not subject to collateral attack in this proceeding. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1); *ITT World Communications*, 466 U.S. at 468-69.

8. *Combination of Toll and Local Traffic*

US West argues the district court erred in upholding the provisions in the TCG Agreement permitting TCG to combine local and toll traffic on two-way trunks. The FCC regulations require an incumbent carrier to provide two-way trunking where the competing carrier has insufficient traffic to justify use of separate one-way trunks and two-way trunking is technically feasible. *See Local Competition Order* at ¶ 219; *see also* 47 C.F.R. § 51.305(f) ("If technically feasible, an incumbent [carrier] shall provide two-way trunking upon request."). The regulation is not subject to collateral attack in this proceeding. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1); *ITT World Communications*, 466 U.S. at 468-69.

9. *Providing Adequate Security at Collocation Sites*

Because of the sensitive nature of the technology at incumbent carriers' facilities, the FCC permits incumbent carriers to "require reasonable security arrangements" to separate a collocating carrier's space from the incumbent carrier's facilities. 47 C.F.R. §51.323(i). US West proposed providing escorts, at TCG's expense, while TCG employees were in US West's facilities. The Commission concluded less costly arrangements would be adequate, and adopted TCG's proposal to permit US West to require screening and bonding in reasonable amounts for TCG personnel in US West facilities.

We affirm the district court's holding that the bonding and screening provision provided a "reasonable" security arrangement as required by the Act and its implementing regulations. *See* 47 U.S.C. §251(c)(6); 47 C.F.R. §51.323(i). This is the same security standard US West imposes on its own workforce. The Commission's decision that this arrangement was prefer-

able to US West's suggestion of escorts was not arbitrary and capricious.

10. *Requiring US West to Enter Into Future Agreement on Access to Poles, Conduits, Ducts, Rights of Way*

We uphold a provision in the TCG Agreement[16] requiring TCG and US West to negotiate a future agreement for pole attachment and conduit usage as an "appropriate condition" to implement the statutory duty of US West to afford access to poles, ducts, conduits and rights-of-way. *See* 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(b)(4); 252(b)(4)(C); 252(c)(1). US West argues that the Commission may impose the duty, but may not require US West to enter into a future agreement to provide such access.

State commissions impose "appropriate conditions as required" only to "ensure that such resolutions and conditions meet the requirements of section 251." 47 U.S.C. §§ 252(b)(4)(C), 252(c)(1). Section 251 lists many duties of incumbent carriers, including the "duty to afford access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way of the [incumbent] carrier to competing providers of telecommunications services on rates, terms, and conditions that are consistent with section 224." 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(4).

Because US West and TCG could not agree to a provision regarding US West's duty to afford TCG access to poles and conduits, requiring the parties to enter into a future agreement was appropriate to ensure US West fulfills its duty to provide access.[17]

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[16] The TCG Agreement states: "Parties agree to negotiate and execute a separate agreement for pole attachment and conduit usage within 30 days of either Party requesting the other to negotiate such an agreement."

[17] Generally, an agreement to agree in the future is not enforceable. *See Kapetan v. Kelso*, 481 P.2d 24, 25 (Wash. App. 1971) (quoting *Sandeman v. Sayres*, 314 P.2d 428,429 (Wash. App. 1957) ("An agreement for an agreement, or in other words, an agreement to do something which requires a fur-

Takings Claims

US West argues that the Commission's imposition of arbitration terms constituted a taking of US West's property without just compensation, because the rates included in the agreements do not provide for full cost recovery. The district court concluded this Fifth Amendment claim was not ripe and dismissed it. We affirm.

In *Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank*, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), the Supreme Court held that a regulatory taking claim against a state is not ripe until (1) the state agency imposing the allegedly confiscatory regulation has taken final action against the plaintiff's property and (2) the plaintiff has pursued all available remedies under state law. *See id.* at 186-97. Because the rates included in the agreements approved by the Commission are interim rates and US West may receive retroactive compensation for the interim period, the agency has not taken final action on the allegedly confiscatory rates and the takings claim is not ripe. Moreover, because Washington law provides a remedy for takings, *see* Washington State Const. art. I, § 16; *see also, Manufactured Housing Communities. v. Washington*, 951 P.2d 1142 (Wash. App. 1998), US West must pursue that remedy before bringing an action under the Fifth Amendment in federal court.

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a further meeting of the minds of the parties and without which it would not be complete is unenforcible [sic]."); 1 Farnsworth on Contracts § 3.26 at 345 (1998) (generally an agreement to negotiate is not enforceable); 1 Williston on Contracts, § 4.26 at 585 (1990) (generally an agreement to agree is not enforcable). This general rule does not apply where a state commission, pursuant to a federal statute, arbitrates and makes a *binding* decision on terms which are included in an interconnection agreement. *See* 47 U.S.C. 252(b)(1). A "meeting of the minds" is not necessary to bind parties to the terms of an interconnection agreement which results from arbitration and a binding decision of a governmental agency.

US West argues that the Act effects a physical taking of its property, rather than a regulatory taking, but does not explain how this difference affects the ripeness of its claim. A court often must await final agency action before it can determine if a taking has occurred, because it must assess whether the regulation has deprived the property owner of all economically viable use of the property. In physical taking cases, whether a taking has occurred usually is not disputed. Even if the taking is established, however, a taking claim is not ripe until the state has taken final action on the plaintiff's request for just compensation. No court could determine whether US West will receive just compensation until the pricing issues have been finally resolved. Even after the Commission approves permanent prices, US West must pursue its state remedies before a federal court can determine whether the state has provided just compensation.[18]

We affirm the district court's dismissal of US West's takings claims because they are not ripe for review.

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[18] US West argues it is not necessary to present its claims in state court before seeking relief in federal court, citing *US West Communications, Inc. v. TCG Oregon*, D.N. 97-858-JE (D. Or. 1998), *reprinted in part in* 98-35203 Blue Br. at App. 33-38 (relying on *Dodd v. Hood River County*, 59 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 1995)). *Dodd* held that *Williamson* did not require plaintiffs to pursue Fifth Amendment takings claims in state court before seeking relief in federal court. *See id.* at 859. *Williamson*, we explained, only requires plaintiffs to pursue state remedies before bringing a Fifth Amendment claim. *See id.* As noted above, Washington law does provide an independent remedy for takings, and US West must pursue that remedy before seeking relief under the Fifth Amendment.

APPENDIX B

[Filed Jan. 7, 1998]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

No. C97-222WD

U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
Plaintiff,

v.

MFS INTELENET, INC., *et al.*
Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

This action is brought by U S West Communications, Inc. ("US West") pursuant to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "Act"), 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6), for judicial review of an agreement approved by the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (the "WUTC") concerning interconnection between US West and MFS Intelenet, Inc. ("MFS"), an entrant into a local telecommunications market. The defendants are MFS and the WUTC and its commissioners. The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has filed a brief *amicus curiae*.

Pursuant to the Act, entrants into a local telecommunications market may demand the following from an incumbent local ex-

change carrier ("LEC") : (1) interconnection with its local network; (2) access to its individual "network elements", such as routers and switches, "at cost"; and (3) at wholesale, rights to the services the incumbent LEC offers its customers at retail. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)-(4).

On February 8, 1996, MFS requested access negotiations with US West. The Act requires both parties to negotiate in good faith. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(1), 252(a)(1). When negotiations failed to produce an agreement, MFS requested, and was afforded, arbitration as authorized by the Act. 47 U.S.C. § 252(b). An arbitrator was appointed, held hearings, and issued a decision. On December 9, 1996, the parties submitted an interconnection agreement reflecting the arbitration decision. The WUTC approved the agreement on January 8, 1997. Following that approval, US West brought this action pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6), which provides:

> In any case in which a State commission makes a determination under this section, any party aggrieved by such determination may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to determine whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements of section 251 of this title and this section.

All parties have moved for summary judgement. The materials filed, and the arguments of counsel heard on December 4, 1997, have been fully considered. Because there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial, the case may be decided on summary judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

II. SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

While the Act, at section 252(e)(6), authorizes judicial review of "the agreement," review necessarily extends to "the various decisions made by the [state commission] throughout the arbitration period which later became part of the agreement. . . ."

GTE South Inc. v . Morrison, 957 F. Supp. 800, 804 (E.D. Va. 1997).

As to the record to be reviewed, the Supreme Court has held that "in cases where Congress has simply provided for review, without setting forth the standards to be used or the procedures to be followed . . . consideration is to be confined to the administrative record and . . . no *de novo* proceeding may be held." *United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co.,* 373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963). Moreover, the Act was intended to facilitate the rapid entry of new competitors into local telecommunications markets. *See Iowa Utilities Bd. v. FCC,* 120 F.3d 753, 791 (8th Cir. 1997). That intent would be frustrated by the reception of new evidence in the reviewing court . Review is thus limited to the administrative record.

As to the standard of review to be applied, a state agency's interpretations of federal law are reviewed *de novo. See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe,* 103 F.3d 1491, 1495-96 (9th Cir. 1997). *Chevron* deference (*see Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council,* 467 U. S. 837 (1984)), is not appropriate where as many as fifty state commissions will be applying the Telecommunications Act. Questions of federal law will be reviewed *de novo.*

The WUTC's findings of fact are a different matter. Substantial deference should be afforded to a state commission's findings because the Act gives it original jurisdiction in the area of rate-setting. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 252(c)(2). Principles of judicial discretion are strongest where the administrative body has primary jurisdiction over the precise matters the court is asked to decide. *See West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser Co.,* 893 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1990).

Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC makes clear that the state commissions have original jurisdiction over the setting of prices, including discretion to choose the methodology for calculating cost, as long as the terms of the Act are not violated. 120 F.3d at

794. The Eighth Circuit rejected an FCC order requiring state commissions to apply so-called TELRIC methodology to determine prices; the FCC may not "preempt any state pricing regulation that would employ a different methodology." *Id.* at 798, n. 19.

The choice of pricing and cost methodology thus rests with the commission. Its determinations in those respects must be treated as fact findings and reviewed to test whether they are arbitrary and capricious. With that deferential standard, a reviewing court under the Administrative Procedures Act (analogous here) is to consider whether the agency's decision was based on consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. *See City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. United States Dep't of Transp.*, 95 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1996). The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. *Id.*

III. SPECIFIC CLAIMS

The prices set in the agreement approved by the WUTC are interim prices; that is, they are subject to change during the agency's generic price and cost proceeding. It has not been shown that the WUTC used any erroneous interpretation of the Act. As to US West's specific claims:

1. The WUTC's approval of the interim unbundled loop price of $13.37 was not arbitrary or capricious. This price was chosen based on substantial information, including the WUTC's "Fifteenth Supplemental Order", Docket No. UT-950200 (recommended price: $13.38), US West's proposed tariff in another proceeding, Docket No. UT- 941464 (maximum proposed price: $19.24), and the FCC's proposed proxy price for Washington ($13.37), *see First Report and Order, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunication Act of 1996*, Appendix B, CC Docket No. 96-98 (Aug. 8, 1996), 11 FCC Rcd 15499, at ¶¶ 788-794 (hereinafter "FCC Order").

US West argues that the WUTC violated section 252(d)(1) of the Act by referring to a "rate-of-return or other rate based proceeding", i.e. the Fifteenth Supplemental Order. But the Fifteenth Supplemental Order was based not on rates of return but on an incremental cost methodology called TSLRIC. *See* Arbitrator's Report at 5. This is the type of methodology recommended in the FCC Order at paragraphs 630 and 635.

The company also argues that use of the FCC proxy price was improper in light of *Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC*, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997). The Eighth Circuit held, however, that the FCC did not have jurisdiction to make *rules* regarding interconnection prices. The decision did not affect the validity of the underlying methodology used by the FCC, which can still be informative. The WUTC made clear it was "free . . . to disregard those specific requirements" if it chose to, and that it was considering the proxy prices for their underlying methodology.

2. The WUTC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in rejecting US West's request to impose special charges for construction costs and conditioning. It found that US West had offered no evidence of actual construction costs, or of a proper formula to use, or of how costs should be allocated among customers and competitors. WUTC's Order at 16-17.

3. US West has not shown that the agreement violates the Act by permitting "sham unbundling." "The Act contemplates that an entrant may provide service to its customers by combining an LEC's network elements. *See* § 251(c)(3); *Iowa Utility Board*, 120 F.3d at 814. MFS is not required to provide any of its *own* elements in order to engage in rebundling. FCC Order at ¶ 328.

US West argues, nevertheless, that the agreement violates the Act by requiring US West to do the rebundling for MFS. The *Iowa Utilities* case rejected an FCC rule compelling incumbents to recombine network elements for an entrant (*see* 120 F. 3d at 813; amendment to the second *Iowa Utilities* decision, 1997 WL 658718 (October 14, 1997)), but the reasoning that led to that

holding does not apply here. The Eighth Circuit emphasized that compelled recombination would undermine the difference between wholesale prices for finished service and the "at-cost" price paid for network elements. 120 F.3d at 813. Here, any unfair cost arbitrage is precluded by use of a recombination fee equal to the difference between the cost and the wholesale rate for finished service.

4. The WUTC's approval of a wholesale discount of 21% off retail price was not arbitrary or capricious. The agency relied on the FCC's recommended range of 17-25%. *See* FCC Order at ¶¶ 932-933. US West's proposal was properly rejected as not complying with section 252(d)(3) of the Act, which requires the parties to start with the retail price and deduct costs avoided ("top down" pricing). The WUTC reasonably characterized US West's method as improper "bottom up" pricing, in which expenses are added together to determine a "wholesale" price.

5. The WUTC's finding that the unregulated and deregulated services are "telecommunications services" was not arbitrary or capricious. The agency correctly applied the Act in denying US West's claim that it is not required to sell unregulated or deregulated services. The Act requires incumbent LECs to "offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications service that the carrier provides at retail." 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4). The definition of telecommunications services is broad. 47 U.S.C. § 153 (46).

6. The WUTC's finding that MFS's switches function as tandem switches more than as end office switches was not arbitrary or capricious. The commission determined the cost of call termination accordingly. In doing so, it did not violate the Act when it relied on approximations of costs submitted by MFS; rates need only be based on "reasonable approximations." 47 U.S.C. § 252 (d)(2)(A)(ii).

7. The WUTC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding not to change the current treatment of ESP call termination from reciprocal compensation to special access fees. The deci-

sion was properly based on FCC regulations which exempt ESP providers from paying access charges. *See* 47 C.F.R. pt. 69.

8. The WUTC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in choosing MFS's proposed division of "switched access charges" for long distance calls which are delivered to the ported numbers of each company. FCC regulations require carriers to share the switched access revenues received for a ported call. *First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Telephone Number Portability*, CC Docket No. 95-116 (July 2, 1996), 11 FCC Rcd 8352, at ¶ 140. The methodology employed for sharing access charges is left to the discretion of the commission.

9. The WUTC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in approving a cost recovery mechanism for number portability based on the number of active local numbers each company has. The FCC has indicated that it approves portability surcharges computed on that basis. Id. at ¶¶ 130, 136. It is within a commission's discretion to approve a method based on the FCC's recommendation.

10. The WUTC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in approving MFS's request for a single interconnection point per LATA. The agency correctly applied the Act when it limited its review to the technical feasibility of the LATA connection approved in the agreement. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(B) and FCC Order at ¶ 209. US West's argument that the WUTC had not considered the cost of minimal LATA connections by MFS was correctly rejected. "A determination of technical feasibility does not include consideration of economic, accounting, [or] billing . . . concerns." 47 C.F.R. § 51.5. US West presented no evidence on the issue of technical feasibility of MFS's chosen points of connection.

11. US West's due process claims are without basis. The company has failed to show that any finding of fact was arbitrary and capricious, or that any error of law was committed. *Yang v. Shalala*, 22 F.3d 213, 217 (9th Cir. 1994), cited by US West, is

not controlling because here the arbitrator and the WUTC based their decisions on the evidence submitted by the parties.

In sum, it has not been shown that the WUTC or the arbitrator acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or contrary to law, in making any relevant determination, or that the agreement violates the Act. Accordingly, US West's motion for summary judgment is denied. Defendants' motions for summary judgment are granted except as to the taking claim, discussed below.

IV. US WEST'S TAXING CLAIM

US West claims that the WUTC's approval of the agreement amounts to an unconstitutional taking. A taking claim under the United States Constitution is not ripe until (a) there is a final decision by the state regarding the property; and (b) the plaintiff has attempted to obtain just compensation for the property in state court. *Williamson Planning Comm'n v . Hamilton Bank*, 473 U.S. 172, 186-97 (1985). These requirements are not met here, and the taking claim, because it is not ripe, must be dismissed without prejudice.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, defendants are awarded summary judgment as to all claims except US West's taking claim, which will be dismissed without prejudice. Judgment will be entered accordingly.

The clerk is directed to send copies of this order to all counsel of record.

Dated: January 6, 1998.

/s/ William L. Dwyer
WILLIAM L. DWYER
United States District Judge

APPENDIX C

[Service Date Jan. 8, 1997]

BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES
AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

Docket No. UT-960323

In the Matter of the Petition for Arbitration
of an Interconnection Agreement Between

MFS COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, INC.
AND US WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

Pursuant to 47 USC § 252

ORDER APPROVING NEGOTIATED AND
ARBITRATED INTERCONNECTION AGREEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Procedural History

On February 8, 1996, MFS Communications Company, Inc. ("MFS") requested negotiations with U S WEST Communications, Inc. ("USWC") for interconnection under the terms of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Public Law No. 104-104, 101 Stat. 56, *codified* at 47 USC § 151 et seq. (1996) (the "1996 Act" or "the Act").

On June 24, 1996, MFS timely filed with the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission ("Commission") and served on USWC, a petition for arbitration pursuant to 47 USC § 252(b)(1): The matter was designated Docket No. UT-960323. On June 28, 1996, the Commission entered an Order on Arbitra-

tration Procedure appointing Simon Ffitch as the arbitrator for this proceeding and establishing certain procedural requirements.

USWC filed its response to the petition. Petitions to intervene were filed by AT&T Communications of the Pacific Northwest, Inc. and Telephone Ratepayers Association for Cost Based and Equitable Rates. The petitions were denied in the Arbitrator's Second and Third Procedural Orders respectively.

"Final offer" (or "last best offer") arbitration was adopted for this arbitration pursuant to the Arbitrator's Fourth Procedural Order. In preparing the arbitration report in this matter, the arbitrator selected between the parties' last proposals as to each unresolved issue, selecting the proposal which is most consistent with the requirements of state and federal law and Commission policy. The arbitrator stated he would choose either an entire proposal, or choose between parties' proposals on an issue-by-issue basis. In the event that neither proposal was consistent with law or Commission policy, the arbitrator stated he would render a determination in keeping with those requirements. No party objected to the adoption of "last best offer" arbitration in the Arbitrator's Fourth Procedural Order.

A hearing was held before the arbitrator on September 18 and 19, 1996, at the offices of the Commission in Olympia, Washington. MFS was represented by Douglas Bonner, attorney at law. USWC was represented by Ed Shaw and Lisa Anderl, attorneys at law. Following the hearing, the parties filed final briefs and final offers on October 2 and 8.

On November 8, 1996, the Arbitrator's Report and Decision was issued resolving the disputed issues presented in the final briefs and offers. See attached, Appendix A. The parties were instructed to submit an interconnection agreement in accordance with the Arbitrator's Report and Decision within 30 days.

On December 9, 1996, MFS filed a Memorandum Requesting Approval of Arbitrated Interconnection Agreement. On the same

Agreement and a Request to Adopt, Modify, and Reject the Interconnection Agreement. Also on December 9, 1996, the parties filed a signed Arbitrated Interconnection Agreement for the State of Washington. Copies of the requests for approval were served on the Commission's service list for this proceeding to allow for comment by interested persons. Written comments were filed by Telephone Ratepayers Association for Cost-Based and Equitable Rates (TRACER).

The Commission reviewed the proposed Arbitrated Interconnection Agreement, the issues presented by the Arbitration Report and Decision, the parties filings and the record herein.

On January 6, 1997, the Commission held an open meeting at its Main Hearing Room in Olympia, Washington to consider the request for approval of the Arbitrated Interconnection Agreement. Commission staff presented its recommendation that the agreement be approved. Oral comments were made by counsel for MFS, USWC and TRACER. MFS and USWC each asked the Commission to reject certain portions of the agreement and to approve the remainder of the provisions. TRACER opposed approval of the provisions relating to reciprocal compensation.

At the conclusion of the open meeting, the Commission approved all provisions of the Arbitrated Interconnection Agreement as submitted and directed that a written order be prepared.

B. Generic Pricing Proceeding

On October 23, 1996, the Commission entered an order in this and other arbitration dockets declaring that a generic proceeding would be initiated in order to review costing and pricing issues for interconnection, unbundled network elements, transport and termination and resale.[1] The Commission stated that rates adopted in the pending arbitrations would be interim rates,

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[1] Order on Sprint's Petition to Intervene and to Establish Generic Pricing Proceeding (October 23, 1996) ("Generic Pricing Order")

pending the completion of the generic proceeding. Accordingly, the price proposals made in this arbitration have been reviewed with the goal of determining which offers a more reasonable interim rate. The conclusions of the arbitrator with respect to price proposals and supporting information are made in this context and do not necessarily indicate Commission approval or rejection of cost and price proposals for purposes of the generic case.

C. The Eighth Circuit Order and the FCC Rules

The FCC rules[2] implementing the local competition provisions of the Act have been appealed and those rules relating to costing and pricing have been stayed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.[3] The provisions of the FCC order and rules not subject to stay are adhered to in the Arbitrator's Report and Decision and this order. Those provisions which are subject to stay do not require compliance pending resolution of the underlying appeal. This Commission is free, therefore, to disregard those specific federal requirements. The stay does not preclude reference, however, to underlying rationale and analysis contained in the federal order for whatever value it may have on its merits.

Having considered the Arbitrator's Report and Decision, the Arbitration Interconnection Agreement and accompanying requests for approval filed by the parties to this arbitration, the entire record herein, and all written and oral comments made to the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission ("Commission"), the Commission makes the following findings and conclusions:

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[2] *In the Matter of the Implementation of the Local Competition Rules of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*. CC Docket No. 96-98. First Report and Order (August 8, 1996). Appendix B-Final Rules.

[3] Iowa Utilities Board et al. v. FCC. No. 96-3321. Order Granting Stay Pending Judicial Review (8th Cir. Oct. 15, 1996). The order also stays the "MFN" rule.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission is an agency of the state of Washington, vested by statute with authority to regulate in the public interest the rates, services, facilities and practices of telecommunications companies in the state.

2. The Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission is designated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as the agency responsible for arbitrating and approving interconnection agreements between telecommunications carriers, pursuant to Sections 251 and 252 of the Act.

3. This arbitration and approval process was conducted pursuant to and in compliance with the Commission's *Interpretive and Policy Statement Regarding Negotiation, Mediation, Arbitration, and Approval of Agreements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Docket No. UT 960269, June 27, 1996. The arbitrator's adoption of "last best offer" arbitration in the Fourth Procedural Order was reasonable and consistent with the authority delegated to the arbitrator in the Commission's Order on Arbitration Procedure, June 28, 1996. No party objected to adoption of "last best offer" arbitration in the Fourth Procedural Order.

4. On November 8, 1996, pursuant to the Commission's Order On Arbitration Procedure in this docket, the arbitrator issued an Arbitrator's Report and Decision resolving the disputed issues between the parties to this proceeding, MFS and USWC. *See* Appendix A.

5. On December 9, 1996, the parties submitted a signed Arbitrated Interconnection Agreement to the Commission for approval in part. The Arbitrated Interconnection Agreement properly incorporates the decisions of the arbitrator as to the disputed issues. To the extent the final provisions vary from specific de-

cisions of the arbitrator, pursuant to agreement of the parties, the provisions are treated as negotiated provisions.

6. The Commission has reviewed and analyzed the staff recommendation, the Arbitrator's Report and Decision, the Arbitrated Interconnection Agreement, the filings of the parties, and the record herein, including the oral comments made at the open meeting. The Commission hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the findings and conclusions of the Arbitrator's Report and Decision.

7. At an open meeting on January 6, 1997, the Commission adopted the staff recommendation that the Arbitrated Interconnection Agreement be approved as submitted.

8. USWC made reference in its filings to the "competitive checklist" requirements of Section 271 of the Act.[4] This order makes no findings with regard to the requirements of that section and no determination as to whether USWC is in compliance.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The arbitrated provisions of the Arbitrated Interconnection Agreement meet the requirements of Section 251 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, including the regulations prescribed by the Federal Communications Commission pursuant to Section 251 which have not been stayed, and the pricing standards set forth in Section 252(d) of the Act.

2. The negotiated provisions of the Act do not discriminate against a telecommunications carrier not a party to the agreement and are consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.

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[4] 47 USC §§ 271(c)(2)(3).

3. The Arbitrated Interconnection agreement is otherwise consistent with Washington law and with the orders and policies of this Commission.

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The Arbitrated Interconnection Agreement for the State of Washington between MFS Intelenet, Inc., and U S WEST Communications, Inc., is approved.

2. The prices contained in the Agreement are interim prices, subject to replacement by prices adopted in the Commission's generic cost and price proceeding, Docket No. UT 960369 et al.

3. In the event that the parties revise, modify or amend the Agreement approved herein, the revised, modified, or amended Agreement shall be deemed a new negotiated agreement under the Telecommunications Act and shall be submitted to the Commission for approval, pursuant to 47 USC §§ 252(e)(1) and relevant provisions of state law, prior to taking effect.

DATED at Olympia, Washington and effective this 8th day of January 1997.

WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND
TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

/s/ Sharon L. Nelson
SHARON L. NELSON
Chairman

/s/ Richard Hemstad
RICHARD HEMSTAD
Commissioner

/s/ William R. Gillis
WILLIAM R. GILLIS
Commissioner

APPENDIX D

[Service Date Nov. 8, 1996]

BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES
AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

Docket No. UT-960323

In the Matter of the Petition for Arbitration
of an Interconnection Agreement Between

MFS COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, INC.
AND US WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

Pursuant to 47 USC Section 252

ARBITRATOR'S REPORT AND DECISION

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Procedural History

On February 8, 1996, MFS Communications Company, Inc. ("MFS") requested negotiations with U S WEST Communications, Inc. ("USWC") for interconnection under the terms of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Public Law No. 104-104, 101 Stat. 56, *codified at* 47 USC § 151 *et seq.* (1996) (the "1996 Act" or "the Act").

On June 24, 1996, MFS timely filed with the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission ("Commission") and served on USWC, a petition for arbitration pursuant to 47 USC § 252(b)(1). The matter was designated Docket No. UT-960323. On June 28, 1996, the Commission entered an Order on Arbitration Procedure appointing the undersigned as the ar-

bitrator for this proceeding and establishing certain procedural requirements.

USWC filed its response to the petition. Petitions to intervene were filed by AT&T Communications of the Pacific Northwest, Inc. and Telephone Ratepayers Association for Cost Based and Equitable Rates. The petitions were denied in the Arbitrator's Second and Third Procedural Orders respectively.

"Final offer" arbitration was adopted for this arbitration pursuant to the Arbitrator's Fourth Procedural Order. In preparing the arbitration report in this matter, the arbitrator will select between the parties' last proposals as to each unresolved issue, selecting the proposal which is most consistent with the requirements of state and federal law and Commission policy. The arbitrator will choose either an entire proposal, or choose between parties' proposals on an issue-by-issue basis. In the event that neither proposal is consistent with law or Commission policy, the arbitrator will render a determination in keeping with those requirements.

A hearing was held before the arbitrator on September 18 and 19, 1996, at the offices of the Commission in Olympia, Washington. MFS was represented by Douglas Bonner, attorney at law. USWC was represented by Ed Shaw and Lisa Anderl, attorneys at law. Following the hearing, the parties filed final briefs and final offers on October 2 and 8.

B. Resolved Issues

During the course of the arbitration, a large number of issues were resolved by the parties. Resolution of issues continued after the hearing. The arbitrator has used the Joint Position Statement (JPS)[1] filed by the parties as the definitive statement of

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[1] Joint Position Statement of MFS Intelenet, Inc., and U S WEST Communications, Inc., on Negotiated Terms To Be Included in an Arbitrated Interconnection Agreement, October 2,1996. Appendix A of the agreement is

unresolved issues. This report is limited to consideration of those issues. 47 USC § 252(b)(4)(A), (C). The duty to negotiate in good faith, raised earlier by MFS, was not addressed in the final briefs and will not be treated here as a disputed issue.

USWC made reference in its filings to the "competitive checklist" requirements of section 271 of the Act.[2] This report makes no findings with regard to the requirements of that section and no determination as to whether USWC is in compliance.

C. Generic Pricing Proceeding

On October 23, 1996, the Commission entered an order in this and other arbitration dockets declaring that a generic proceeding would be initiated in order to review costing and pricing issues for interconnection, unbundled network elements, transport and termination and resale.[3] The Commission stated that rates adopted in the pending arbitrations would be interim rates, pending the completion of the generic proceeding. Accordingly, the price proposals made in this arbitration have been reviewed with the goal of determining which offers a more reasonable interim rate. The conclusions of the arbitrator with respect to price proposals and supporting information are made in this context and do not necessarily indicate Commission approval or rejection of cost and price proposals for purposes of the generic case.

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attached. Due to its length the entire agreement is not included. Copies of the entire agreement can be obtained from the Commission's Records Center.

[2] 47 USC § 271(c)(2)(B)

[3] Order on Sprint's Petition to Intervene and to Establish Generic Pricing Proceeding (October 23, 1996) ("Generic Pricing Order")

D. The Eighth Circuit Order and the FCC Rules

As the parties are aware, the FCC rules[4] implementing the local competition provisions of the Act have been appealed and those rules relating to costing and pricing have been stayed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.[5] The provisions of the FCC order and rules not subject to stay are adhered to in this report. Those provisions which are subject to stay do not require compliance pending resolution of the underlying appeal. The arbitrator is free, therefore, to disregard those specific federal requirements. The stay does not preclude reference, however, to underlying rationale and analysis contained in the federal order for whatever value it may have on its merits.

II. RESOLUTION OF DISPUTED ISSUES

A. Unbundled Elements

1. Price of the Unbundled Loop

MFS Position

MFS advocates the use of the FCC proxy ceiling for Washington of $13.37 per month as the interim loop rate. MFS argues that the rate is consistent with the Commission's determination of loop cost in the USWC rate case, and with USWC's tariff filing in June 1996 for multi-line business LIS link of $16.83, based on USWC's own TSLRIC.

MFS argues that the USWC TELRIC methodology is flawed because USWC has "loaded" its cost calculation with impermissible costs, including embedded and opportunity costs, in an

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[4] *In the Matter of the Implementation of the Local Competition Rules of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC Docket No. 96-98, First Report and Order (August 8, 1996), Appendix B—Final Rules.

[5] *Iowa Utilities Board et al. v. FCC*, No. 96-3321, Order Granting Stay Pending Judicial Review (8th Cir. Oct. 15, 1996). The order also stays the "MFN" rule.

effort to make up for lost revenues and profits expected to result from competition. MFS challenges USWC's use of depreciation lives and cost of money which are not consistent with the most recent rate order.

USWC Position

USWC supports a price of $36.20.[6] USWC asserts that its cost studies comply with the TELRIC methodology prescribed by the FCC Interconnection Order and with the costing and pricing requirements in section 252 of the Act. USWC argues that, under the terms of the FCC order, since it has presented a proper TELRIC cost study to support its loop rate, interim proxy rates are not appropriate. USWC also argues that MFS' failure to devote adequate resources to review of the USWC cost studies does not mean that USWC has failed in its burden of proof.

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, Appendix A, p. 4 (Ancillary Services: Unbundled Loops)

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts $13.37 as the interim rate for the unbundled loop.

Discussion

This is "final offer" arbitration. The two offers presented differ dramatically. The arbitrator's task is not "split the difference" but to select the offer which most closely complies with the requirements of the federal Act, any applicable FCC requirements, and with this Commission's orders. The rate

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[6] The weighted area average unbundled loop rate originally proposed by USWC in its final offer filing in this proceeding was $38.22. In subsequent filings made by USWC in connection with the cost study, this loop amount was revised to $36.20. *See*, Errata to Washington Testimony and Exhibits of Robert Bowman, Item 7 (submitted at UT-960309 hearing, 10/21-22, 1996).

adopted here, following Commission approval of the interconnection agreement, will remain in effect pending the outcome of the Commission's generic pricing proceeding.[7]

The provisions of the 1996 Act relevant to the determination of the loop pricing issue are contained in section 252(d). Section 252(d)(1) provides that rates shall be just and reasonable and shall be:

> "(i) based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate based proceeding) of providing the interconnection or network element (whichever is applicable), and
>
> (ii) nondiscriminatory, and
>
> (iii) may include a reasonable profit."

The Commission has previously had occasion to review loop costs for USWC. In *Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission v. U S WEST Communications, Inc.*, Docket No. UT-950200, Fifteenth Supplemental Order (April 1996) ("USWC rate order"), the Commission found, based on evidence in the record that the approximate cost of USWC's un-

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[7] Generic Pricing Order, at 5. This would be the case unless MFS chose to invoke the provisions of 47 USC § 252(1).

bundled loop was $8.96.[8] These are TSLRIC figures which establish a price floor.[9]

In the rate case, USWC submitted Average Service Incremental Cost (ASIC) presentations in support of its own position as to a proper price for local service. While the precise figures were confidential and not stated in the rate order, the Commission concluded that "the evidence is overwhelming that (residential) local exchange service does cover its [TSLRIC]—even as calculated by the Company in its Average Service Incremental Cost (ASIC) presentation. . . ."[10] Put another way, there was evidence in the record that USWC's own calculation placed the loop cost at something less than $14.00.[11] This provides an additional point of comparison demonstrating the reasonableness of the MFS proposed rate.

When asked in the arbitration hearing about the Commission's conclusions as to loop cost in the rate order, USWC's response has been to acknowledge the findings but to state that

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[8] The context of the finding was an analysis of the incremental cost of local service which includes both the loop and usage. The incremental cost of local service was $4.42, which added to the loop cost yields a total of $13.38. USWC rate order, p. 90, citing Hatfield model estimates presented in the proceeding. *See also*, USWC rate order, p. 132 (Finding of Fact 19), p. 135 (Ordering paragraph 2). Revisions to the Hatfield model have been made subsequent to the rate case. No party has argued that the revisions result in loop costs in the range recommended by USWC.

[9] In the USWC rate order, the Commission found TSLRIC to be an appropriate measure of costs, representing an economic price floor. USWC rate order, p. 82. *See also*, USWC rate order, p. 132 (Finding of Fact 18).

[10] USWC rate order, p. 79. *See also*, p. 82 (discussion of USWC ADSRC cost methodology, including ASIC), p. 86 ("Correcting the USWC local exchange model with the tools and inputs available provides verification for the Hatfield model").

[11] The $14.00 figure includes $10.50 for local residential exchanges service and $3.50 for the subscriber line charge (SLC).

the order is on appeal. *See, e.g.*, Tr. at 330-331 (Bowman), Tr. at pp.413-414, 419-420 (Moran).

As MFS noted at the hearing and in its brief, USWC filed a proposed tariff in June 1996 in Docket No. UT-941464, establishing loop rates for residential and for multi-line business service at $19.24 and $16.83 respectively.[12] These rates were based on TSLRIC. USWC's argument that the methodology for these rates differed from TELRIC is not persuasive. The difference is at least in part due to the company's use of inputs which have been disapproved by the Commission in the rate case. (See discussion below). Again, these proposed rates are an indication that the cost of the unbundled loop, by USWC's own calculations, is less than the proposed rates shown, and that an appropriate price is in the range of the rate proposed by MFS.

The $13.37 rate proposed by MFS is taken from the FCC interconnection order.[13] To calculate proxy rates for unbundled loops, the FCC used the Benchmark Cost Model (BCM) and the Hatfield 2.2 cost model, together with rates for unbundled loops that had been adopted in six states based on studies that were, in general, based on forward-looking economic cost.[14] The FCC combined these elements to create a hybrid cost proxy. First, a scaling factor was applied to the cost estimates of each model. The scaling factor was based on the actual rates computed from unbundled loop elements in the six states listed in the footnote. The cost estimate produced by each model in each state was multiplied by a factor equal to the unweighted average of rates adopted by state commissions in the six states, divided by the

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[12] MFS Exhibit 13. USWC Advice No. 2775T. WN-U34. Section 3. Original Sheet 8.

[13] FCC Interconnection Order. ¶¶ 788-794. and Appendix D. (Setting out the FCC methodology).

[14] The six states' averaged rates are: Colorado. $18.00; Connecticut. $12.95; Florida. $17.28; Illinois. $10.93; Michigan. $10.03; Oregon. $12.45.

unweighted average of the model cost estimates for those states. The hybrid cost proxy is computed as the simple average of the scaled cost estimates for the two models in each of the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia. Because the purpose of the proxy is to establish a ceiling, and in order to take into account variations in the data used, an upward adjustment of five percent was made for each state.

Taken together, the unbundled loop cost from the rate case, the USWC ASIC figure from the rate case, the TSLRIC-based rate in the June tariff, and the FCC rationale establish comparators which indicate that the $13.37 figure proposed by MFS is in the range of reasonableness.

USWC's position is based on the premise that its TELRIC study complies with the Act, with FCC requirements, and is otherwise a reliable basis for setting prices. The record, however, indicates some serious flaws in the USWC approach which make the resulting loop prices unacceptable as interim rates.

First, as noted above, the USWC studies entirely disregard the Commission's existing determination as to loop cost.

Second, the USWC cost studies offered to support its final offer position use inputs which are inconsistent with the Commission's recent rate order as to cost of money and depreciation. Tr. at 329-331 (Bowman). For example, the cost of money prescribed in the rate order was 9.37 percent, while that used in the USWC cost study was 11.4 percent. The rate case order states that authorized depreciation rates and the last authorized rate of return are the most appropriate for cost study purposes.[15]

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[15] USWC rate order, at 88.

The rate order also requires the use of objective rather than actual fill factors.[16] USWC uses actual fill in its cost study.[17]

Third, there are indications from the hearing record, that USWC's TELRIC methodology may seek to recover embedded costs or opportunity costs. *See, e.g.*, MFS Ex. 13 (Response to MFS Data Request 01-0023; Tr. at 375, 418-419 (Moran). Such recovery is generally inconsistent with forward-looking cost methodology.

In summary, the MFS recommended loop price is the more reasonable of the two proposals because it is the closest to the loop cost established by the Commission. In addition, the price appears to be more consistent with other cost estimates developed by USWC and with other comparators. The fundamental flaw in USWC's position in this arbitration is failure to propose a rate based on cost inputs found by the Commission to be appropriate.

2. Geographic Deaveraging

MFS Position.

MFS supports geographic deaveraging of rates for the unbundled loop. MFS argues that geographic deaveraging is required by the Act and by the FCC rules, citing 47 CFR § 51.507 (f). MFS offers a deaveraging methodology through the testimony of David Porter, Exhibit 2. MFS proposes the minimum three zones required by the federal rule.

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[16] *Id.*

[17] The arbitrator and arbitration staff asked USWC to perform several additional runs of its cost studies to examine the effect of using different inputs, including inputs consistent with the rate order. None of the additional runs provided in response used exclusively "Commission inputs." The additional runs consistently showed, however, that where Commission inputs were used, the resulting loop rate was lower than that proposed by USWC.

USWC opposes the requirement of geographic deaveraging for unbundled elements such as the loop, at this time. USWC takes the position that deaveraging should not occur until the Commission has adopted deaveraging for retail rates, and cites the Commission's decision against retail deaveraging in the most recent rate case. In the alternative, USWC offers a deaveraging proposal in the event such pricing is required.

Contract Provisions

Appendix A, p. 4, (Unbundled Loops)

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts the USWC position. USWC need not provide geographically deaveraged rates for the unbundled loop.

Discussion

Geographic deaveraging is not expressly required by the federal Act. The express requirement contained in the FCC rules, 47 CFR § 51.507 (f), is currently stayed by the Eighth Circuit Order. Geographic deaveraging of unbundled loop rates is inconsistent with the Commission's decision against adopting retail rate deaveraging in the most recent USWC rate case.[18]

3. Construction (Implementation) Charges

MFS Position

MFS opposes the imposition of construction or "implementation" charges by USWC. MFS argues that implementation costs that are directly attributable to providng an unbundled network element will be included in TELRIC pricing, citing FCC Interconnection Order, ¶ 691. Implementation costs which are not attributable should not be recovered.

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[18] USWC rate order, pp. 106-107.

USWC Position

USWC argues that it should be entitled to recover "special construction charges" to pay costs that it incurs to unbundle and provision elements requested by new entrants. It takes the position that these charges should be paid in advance. USWC asserts that such charges are consistent with the FCC order, "allowing incumbent LECs to recover the costs of unbundling network elements from requesting carriers." USWC Post-Arb. Brief, p. 19.

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, XXXI.B.4.h, p.78 (Unbundled Access Elements)
JPS, XXIX (Construction Charges)

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts the MFS position. USWC may not assess separate "construction" charges in addition to the rate for unbundling and provisioning the local loop.

Discussion

The Act contains no express authority for incumbent LECs to charge "construction" charges in addition to the charge for the unbundled loop. Prices for unbundled elements are to be based on cost and may include a reasonable profit. 47 USC § 252(d)(1)(A), (B). USWC's brief does not cite specific authority in the Act or the FCC rules for the separate recovery of construction charges, other than the general requirement that costs be recovered. USWC witness Moran cites ¶ 200 of the FCC order in support of the general proposition that special construction charges are permissible. USWC Ex. 513, p. 172-173. That paragraph does not directly discuss this point or provide express support for the company's position. MFS argues that a forward-looking cost methodology, by definition, incor-

porates all the direct costs of an element, and therefore, already incorporates this type of cost.[19]

Perhaps most problematic is USWC's proposed contract language on this point. Charges would apply when USWC is required to build facilities, or when USWC determines that placement of facilities will be temporary or when facilities are ordered in advance of actual MFS demand for service. JPS, XXIX.A. The actual construction charges are not specified, but will be "developed" by USWC. JPS, XXIX.B. Except where required, construction is only undertaken "at the discretion of USWC, consistent with budgetary responsibilities and consideration for the impact on the general body of customers. JPS, XXIX.C. Before construction would begin, MFS would be provided with a quote, would then have to accept the quote, be sent a bill, and pay the bill. Construction would not commence until receipt of payment. XXIX.D.

While there may be some situations in which construction charges would be appropriate, these requirements are too open-ended. They provide little certainty to MFS about how a request will be treated, how much it will cost, and how fast it will be processed. The vagueness of the provisions creates undue risk that could be used as a barrier or delay to entry. USWC may still assess construction charges where they are provided for by tariff. In addition, construction charges proposals can be further reviewed in the generic pricing proceeding.

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[19] *See, e.g.*, FCC Interconnection Order, ¶ 690. "[A]ll costs associated with the [sic] providing the element shall be included in the incremental cost." "*See also*, ¶ 691 "Costs must be attributed on a cost-causative basis. Costs are causally-related to the network element being provided if the costs are incurred as a direct result of providing the network elements[.]"

4. Loop Installation

MFS Position

In general, MFS believes USWC's proposed loop installation charges are too high. MFS indicates that it is willing to accept the charges for initial installations, however, if the charge for additional lines is significantly lower. These lower "additional line" charges would apply at the same wire center and on the same service order. The presumption is that the proposed rates include dispatch of personnel to offices not regularly staffed, additional dispatch of testing equipment, personnel with testing skills, and special dispatch for coordinated installations. MFS argues that once the personnel and specialized equipment have handled the first line, however, each additional line in the same office and on the same service order should be a simple, low-cost task to perform in the same visit. USWC proposes identical rates for both the initial and all additional lines. The parties' proposed rates are as follows:

Task	MFS	USWC
Additional loop, no testing	$ 20.00	$ 96.30
Additional loop, basic testing	$ 30.00	$153.86
Add. loop, basic testing at designated time	$ 30.00	$206.02

**Above are per service order*

USWC Position

USWC proposes an equal charge for all lines installed.

Contract Provisions

Appendix A, p. 4 (Unbundled Loops)

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts the MFS position.

Discussion

It is reasonable to conclude that the cost of performing work involving additional lines on the same service order and in the same visit is proportionately lower than that involved with the initial installation. USWC does not adequately explain why the costs of a multi-line installation should, for example, double, or triple based solely on the number of lines involved.

5. Conditioning

MFS Position

MFS opposes additional charges for "conditioning" of loops to provide particular services, especially high bit-rate digital subscriber line (HDSL) service. MFS argues that USWC has not offered any cost justification for this proposal or stated a price level. MFS recommends that USWC's position be rejected without prejudice to reexamination in the consolidated cost proceedings.

USWC Position

As stated in the JPS, XXXI.B.4.a.ii.(a), p. 74:

> To the extent MFS requires an Unbundled Loop to provide ISDN, HDSL, ADSL, or DS1 service, such requirements will be identified on the order for Unbundled Loop Service. Conditioning charges will apply, as required, to condition such loops to ensure the necessary transmission standard.

As noted by MFS, USWC does not appear to propose a price for this service in Appendix A. The issue is not discussed in the post-arbitration brief.

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, XXXI.B.4.a.ii.(a), p. 74. In the JPS filed on October 2 with the arbitrator, however, this provision was not highlighted to indicate disagreement.

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts the MFS position.

Discussion

USWC has not made a case in support of its position, nor provided a proposed rate. This issue can be addressed in the generic proceeding.

6. "Finished Service" Unbundling

MFS Position

MFS states that it has no particular intention of operating a service exclusively by means of combining unbundled elements purchased from USWC into a "finished service." Notwithstanding this position, MFS opposes USWC's proposed limitation on combination of unbundled elements. MFS argues that the FCC Interconnection Order, at ¶¶ 328-341, specifically rejected such a limitation.

USWC Position

USWC proposes a limitation on combination of unbundled elements by another carrier. The specific contract limitation would provide: "USWC will not combine USWC's Unbundled Loops with USWC's Unbundled Switching Element to provide a finished service to MFS." (Contract reference below). USWC acknowledges that the FCC Interconnection Order interprets the Act to preclude such limitations but argues that combining elements to provide a finished service constitutes "sham unbundling" which is contrary to the intent of the Act. USWC urges the arbitrator and the Commission to disregard the FCC order and to prohibit "finished service" or "sham" unbundling.

Without this limitation, USWC argues, MFS can circumvent the resale provisions of the Act. It could avoid the purchase of a retail service at a wholesale rate (i.e., at the retail price less the avoided cost discount) by obtaining the same service through purchase of the necessary unbundled elements that comprise the

service.[20] USWC is concerned that significant opportunities for price arbitrage could be created.

USWC argues that sham unbundling upsets the balance between resale and unbundling that was established in the Act, suggesting that Congress demonstrated its intent by crafting distinct provisions for resale and unbundling.

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, XXXI.A.2, p. 73

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts the MFS position. Paragraph XXXI.A.2 of the Joint Position Statement should not be included in the final contract.

Discussion

The 1996 Act states, in pertinent part, that it is:

> "The duty [of the incumbent LEC] to provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the provision of a telecommunications service . . . access to network elements on an unbundled basis[.] An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service." 47 USC § 251 (c)(3)(emphasis added).

The Act, on its face, therefore, appears to expressly permit the combination of elements by a requesting carrier for the purpose of providing a telecommunications service. As MFS notes, the FCC takes this view, finding no basis to conclude from the

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[20] USWC warns that this approach would allow IXCs to avoid paying switched access charges, but notes that the FCC "appears to have removed this concern" in a subsequent Order on Reconsideration. CC Docket No. 96-98, Order on Reconsideration, FCC 96-394 (September 27, 1996).

Act's language "a limitation or requirement in connection with the right of new entrants to obtain access to unbundled elements." *FCC interconnection Order*, ¶328.[21] Consistent with this interpretation, the FCC rules permit the combination of unbundled elements by requesting carriers to provide a telecommunications service. 47 CFR § 51.315(a). This section of the FCC rules is not subject to the Eighth Circuit stay.

While USWC makes a number of practical and policy arguments against permitting combination of elements into a "finished service," USWC's primary statutory argument is that Congress' incorporation of distinct resale and unbundling provisions allow the inference that Congress intended the limitation that USWC seeks. It does not identify any language in Section 251(c)(3) which supports imposition of such a restriction on unbundling.

B. Resale

1. Price

MFS Position

MFS supports adoption of an across the board resale discount of 21 percent on an interim basis. This represents the mid-point of the FCC recommended proxy range of 17-25 percent.[22] MFS did not submit its own avoided cost study.

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[21] *See generally*, FCC Interconnection Order, ¶¶ 329-341. The FCC rejects many of the arguments raised here by USWC, stating, for example:

> We disagree with the premise that no carrier would consider entering local markets under the terms of section 251(c)(4) [resale] if it could use recombined network elements solely to offer the same or similar services that incumbents offer for resale. We believe that sections 251(c)(3) and 251(c)(4) present different opportunities, risks, and costs in connection with entry into local telephone markets[.]

Id., ¶ 331.

[22] FCC Interconnection Order, ¶ 932-933.

USWC Position

USWC urges the adoption of wholesale discounts based on its own avoided cost studies. These studies would result in discounts of between 1 and 8 percent below retail, depending on the service. USWC argues that it has submitted in evidence cost studies which comply with the Act and are consistent with the FCC requirements.

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, Appendix A, p. 5

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts the MFS proposed rate of 21 percent as a wholesale discount for those services subject to resale under this agreement.

Discussion

Section 252(d)(3), by its terms, adopts a "top-down" approach to the calculation of wholesale discounts. The Act states that wholesale rates shall be determined "on the basis of retail rates charged to subscribers . . . excluding the portion thereof attributable to any marketing, billing, collection, and other costs that will be avoided by the local exchange carrier." A significant difficulty with the USWC proposal in this case is that it appears to be a "bottom up" approach. USWC Ex. 509 (Appendix 2 to Bowman Direct). The USWC proposal results in proposed wholesale rates which range from 92 to 99 percent of full retail price.

As noted above, the arbitrator's task under "final offer "arbitration is to choose the position most consistent with the state and federal law and Commission policy. The MFS proposal is the more reasonable of the two presented. The proposed dis-

count of 21 percent is in the middle of the 17-25 percent range developed by the FCC.[23]

The range is based on a formula combining existing state discounts and a study conducted by MCI. MCI's model uses publicly available USOA data. It analyzes three categories of avoided cost: (1) marketing, billing, and collection costs; (2) other costs; and (3) common costs allocated to avoided cost activities. The FCC made several adjustments to the MCI model, primarily to include more accounts in the category of those "not avoided." With the FCC adjustments, the MCI study yielded a range of discounts for the RBOCs and GTE of 18.80 percent to 25.98 percent. State commissions which had reviewed avoided cost studies based on the statutory standard arrived at a range of discounts of 18.74 percent to 20.07 percent. The combined range was from 18.74 percent to 25.98 percent, with a majority of the discounts falling between 18.74 percent and 21.11 percent. The FCC lowered the bottom of the range to take into account additional state data and the fact that avoided costs for smaller incumbent LECs are likely to be less than those of larger incumbents whose data was used in the MCI study. The 21 percent discount proposed by MFS is in the middle of the 17-25 percent range and also lies within the range of a majority of discounts.

2. Services

a. Volume discounts

MFS Position

MFS takes the position that USWC must provide wholesale discounts on retail telecommunications services that already receive a volume or term discount. MFS argues that the language of section 251(c)(4)(A), requiring that "any telecommunications service" provided at retail must be made available for

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[23] FCC Interconnection Order, ¶ 907-934.

resale, contains no exception for volume or term discounted service. MFS also cites the FCC Interconnection Order's conclusions in support of its position.

MFS dismisses the USWC assertion that setting wholesale prices on volume-discounted service results in a double discount, arguing that the Act's price formula for resale is margin neutral. In response to the assertion that resale on volume services will invariably allow competitors to undercut USWC, MFS points out that this argument does not take into account the fact that the new competitor will incur costs of its own in retailing the service.

USWC Position

USWC asks the arbitrator not to require the company to offer further discounts to resellers that are already offered at a volume discount. The company argues that services that are provided at discounts to large customers such as Boeing or the State of Washington are already priced to reflect the fact that USWC avoids many of the usual costs of selling at retail. In addition, discounts are assertedly based primarily on commitments for certain quantities of service over certain terms. These discounts therefore reflect costs avoided because of quantity and term, for example, avoided marketing expenses. In USWC's view, it makes no sense to apply a further discount to these services. USWC argues that the FCC order is less than clear as to the proper treatment of volume discounts, citing ¶¶ 951 and 952.

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, XXX.A, p. 67; Appendix A, p. 5.

Arbitration Decision.

The arbitrator concludes that volume discounted services must be made available for resale.

Discussion

Section 251(c)(4) of the 1996 Act establishes the resale obligations of incumbent local exchange providers, stating:

> (4) Resale: The duty—
>
> (A) to offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications service that the carrier provides at retail to subscribers who are not telecommunications carriers; and
>
> (B) not to prohibit, and not to impose unreasonable and discriminatory conditions or limitations on, the resale of such telecommunications service, except that a State commission may, consistent with regulations prescribed by the [Federal Communications] Commission under this section, prohibit a reseller that obtains at wholesale rates a telecommunications service that is available at retail only to a category of subscribers from offering such a service to a different category of subscribers.

Section 251(c)(4)(A) does not contain any exemptions or exceptions to the requirement that "any telecommunications service" must be offered for resale if it is offered at retail to end-users. Section 251(c)(4)(B) expressly precludes a LEC prohibition on resale of such services, and only permits restrictions or limitations which are reasonable and non-discriminatory. The Act's language, therefore, does not support USWC's position. As a practical matter, creating such an exemption would permit incumbent LECs to avoid the resale requirement altogether by switching all customers to some form of discounted or promotional service plan.

The FCC order is clear on volume discounted services. The FCC order states:

> We find unconvincing the arguments that the offerings under section 251(c)(4) should not apply to volume-based discounts. The 1996 Act on its face does not exclude such offerings from the wholesale obligation. If a service is

> sold to end-users it is a retail service, even if it is priced as a volume-based discount off the price of another retail service. The avoidable costs for a service with volume-based discounts, however, may be different than without volume discounts.

FCC Interconnection Order, ¶ 951. The FCC rules on resale restrictions do not incorporate an exemption for volume discounts. 47 CFR § 51.613. This provision is not subject to the Eighth Circuit stay. The FCC does go on to note that, while there may be reasonable restrictions on promotions and discounts, *FCC Interconnection Order* ¶ 952, restrictions on resale of volume discounts will "frequently produce anticompetitive results [and] should be considered presumptively unreasonable." *Id.*, ¶ 953.

The FCC order also notes, however, that in calculating the proper wholesale rate, incumbent LECs may prove that their avoided costs differ when selling large volumes. In this arbitration, USWC argues that its volume discounts "reflect costs that are avoided because of the quantities and the term of the contract." USWC Post-Arbitration Brief, p. 11. MFS acknowledges that this may be the case and that the avoided cost discount for volume discounted services could be "low" or "zero" based on an appropriate cost study. Tr. 135-136 (Artman). While this is not a basis for excluding volume discounts entirely from the resale requirement, it can be taken into account in establishing the proper wholesale rate. In this case, the record establishes that USWC avoids retail costs when selling at volume. The record does not enable the arbitrator to determine, however, the extent of avoided costs which remain after USWC applies a discount.

As noted above, the arbitrator does not adopt the USWC wholesale discounts based on its avoided cost study. The Commission has referred resale pricing to a generic proceeding. Any resale rate adopted in this proceeding, therefore, will be an in-

terim rate. In order to arrive at rate for volume discounted services on an interim basis, therefore, the arbitrator will treat the volume discount as a reasonable approximation of the costs avoided by the volume sale. USWC may, therefore, apply the existing volume discount as a "credit." MFS will receive either the volume discounted rate or 21 percent (off the original retail rate), whichever is the larger discount.

b. "Below-cost" residential service

While the parties argued this issue in their final briefs, the matter no longer appears to be in dispute. Appendix A, p. 5. MFS states in the Appendix that USWC shall make its "residence exchange tariff" available for resale "without additional 'Wholesale' discount." USWC lists the "Residence Exchange Tariff" as available for resale at 100 percent of the retail rate. This issue will be treated as a negotiated term of the agreement.

c. "Grandfathered" and other services.

MFS Position

MFS' general position is that all telecommunications service should be offered for resale, except enhanced services. Appendix A, p. 5 (See discussion under a. above). It does not require, however, that wholesale discounts be offered for three services: (1) switched access tariff, (2) special access tariff, and (3) residence exchange tariff. All other services are to be made available for resale at the avoided cost discount, including all contract arrangements, including "off-tariff" arrangements.

USWC Position

USWC argues that withdrawn services, such as Centrex, are not subject to resale, except as to "grandfathered" customers. In addition, USWC's position is that enhanced services (including voice mail) and deregulated services should not be made available for resale.

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, Appendix A, p. 5

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts the MFS position.

Discussion

A number of points are not in dispute. The parties have agreed that switched access, special access,[24] and residential exchange tariffs are available for resale at a zero discount. USWC will not offer enhanced services for resale. All services listed in the USWC table in Appendix A, p. 5, are being made available for resale. The discount rate, where not agreed to by the parties, has been addressed and resolved above.

The USWC brief argued that discontinued services such as Centrex should not be subject to resale, except to grandfathered customers, as required by the FCC order. *FCC Interconnection Order*, ¶ 968. Appendix A lists Centrex Plus as available for resale. In the event the withdrawal of the service is approved by the Commission, MFS may resell the service to grandfathered customers.

All USWC telecommunications services that are provided at retail to non-carrier subscribers must be offered for resale. 47 USC § 251 (c)(4)(A). The only exception for purposes of the arbitration is enhanced services, which the parties have negotiated. USWC seeks to except "deregulated" services. The Act contains no exemption or exception for such services and the

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[24] The USWC brief states that private line service and special access are the same service, as they are sold from the special access tariff. For purposes of this report they will be treated as incorporated in the "special access tariff" agreement negotiated by the parties. In any event, exchange access services generally are not subject to the resale provisions of the Act. *FCC Interconnection Order*, ¶¶ 873-875.

exclusion of these services from resale is therefore not appropriate.

3. Limits to "Intended or Disclosed Use"

MFS Position

MFS opposes the proposed contract language from USWC as an unreasonable condition or limitation on the use of resold service by the reseller's end-user. MFS relies on the Act and on the FCC Interconnection Order's conclusion that restrictions on resale are presumptively unreasonable.

USWC Position

USWC proposes contract language that would state that "Basic Exchange Telecommunications Service may be resold only for its intended or disclosed use." The company apparently justifies this position on the basis of the language in section 251 (c)(4)(B) which precludes resale across categories of customers.

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, XXX.B.1.c, p. 67

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts the MFS position. The proposed contract language should not be included in the agreement.

Discussion

Section 251(c)(4)(B) prohibits unreasonable limitations or conditions on resale. As noted above, the FCC has concluded generally that "resale restrictions are presumptively unreasonable." *FCC Interconnection Order*, ¶ 939. Incumbent LECs can rebut the presumption by showing that the restriction is narrowly tailored. *Id.* The FCC identified only two restrictions it found reasonable: (1) restrictions on resale of short-term promotions; and (2) restrictions on cross-class selling of residential and Lifeline service. Id., ¶ 950, 962. *See also*, 47 CFR § 51.613 (not subject to stay).

The agreed contract language already states that "USWC Basic Exchange Telecommunications Service may be resold only to the same class of customers" to which it is sold by USWC. JPS, XXX.B.1, p. 67. The agreed contract language cites as an example that [r]esidential service may not be resold to business customers . . ." JPS, XXX.B.1.a), p.67. These provisions adequately address the concern raised by USWC and are consistent with the federal Act and the FCC order.

4. Construction Charges

MFS Position

MFS' position is that construction charges are appropriate only in those circumstances where such charges would apply if the end-user ordered the same service directly from USWC. MFS argues that this is consistent with the Act, since, if a retail customer would be required to pay a construction charge to obtain service, then that construction charge is part of the retail rate and would also be included in the wholesale rate. MFS observes that the construction charge in principle would be subject to wholesale discounting, but is unlikely to have significant avoidable costs.

MFS argues that the USWC position is not supported by the language of the Act or the FCC rules. MFS also suggests that it may constitute discrimination if USWC would extend facilities to an end-user on request without a construction charge, but not to a reseller who would serve that same end-user.

USWC Position

USWC takes the position that it must be permitted to charge resellers for construction of new facilities which are required to serve that reseller. Such charges should be paid in full before construction. USWC acknowledges that, in most cases, resale requests will be received in areas where facilities are available. Where this is not the case, however, USWC seeks assurance that it will not be left "holding the bag." This could occur if

MFS were to request construction of facilities by USWC and later abandon the USWC facility after constructing its own. Unless MFS has paid in advance, USWC argues it would have no way to recover these construction costs. In support of its position, USWC cites the FCC Interconnection Order, ¶¶ 200 and 672. USWC Ex. 513 (Moran), at 57-59.

Contract Provision(s).

JPS, XXIX, p. 66 (Construction Charges)

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts the MFS position.

Discussion

The federal Act contains no specific authorization for recovery of construction charges. The provisions of the FCC order cited by USWC witness Moran do not support the company position. Paragraph 200 is a discussion of the relationship of cost and "technical feasibility" under the interconnection and unbundling provisions of the Act, sections 251(c)(2) and 251 (c)(3). Paragraph 672 is a general overview statement by the FCC indicating it intends to adopt forward-looking cost principles to price interconnection and unbundled elements. In the event that a construction charge would be included in a retail rate to an end-user under tariff, MFS indicates that it is willing to pay that amount. The parties may include contract language to that effect at their option. (See discussion of construction charges in Section II.A.3 above).

5. Non-recurring Charges

MFS Position

MFS does not oppose the concept of customer transfer charges, but believes that they should be assessed on a per-customer rather than a per-line basis.

MFS argues that a transfer for resale purposes represents only a change of records rather than serving arrangements and should be no more difficult than a change of billing address. MFS sees no justification for imposing a transfer charge for a five-line customer that is five times that imposed for a single-line customer.

USWC Position

USWC proposes a customer transfer charge of approximately $55.00 on a per-line basis for business, residence, and ISDN customers. The charge is based on USWC TELRIC plus common costs. USWC Ex. 516 (Moran, Ex. C, p.2).

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, Appendix A, p. 6 (Resale Nonrecurring Charges, Customer Transfer Charge)

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts the MFS position.

Discussion

While USWC's proposed rate is based on its TELRIC studies, the company does not explain why it is more reasonable to impose a per-line as opposed to a per-customer charge. Based on the record in the arbitration, the MFS position appears more reasonable as an interim rate.

6. Joint Marketing

Based on the discussion in the MFS post-arbitration brief, it does not appear that any joint marketing issues remain for resolution.

7. Billing Cycle

MFS Position

MFS requests a 90 day time certain for billing all amounts due to USWC for resold service. MFS believes this is more rea-

sonable than USWC's proposal to use existing tariffs because it fixes a time certain for billing within the arbitrated agreement itself, rather than relying on external sources which may change over the life of the agreement.

USWC Position

USWC proposes language that would require that billing for resold services be in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the USWC tariff.

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, XXX.H.7, p. 72 (Resale: Payment)

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts the MFS position.

Discussion

MFS concern that this matter be included within the terms of the agreement is consistent with the "interconnection by agreement" approach of the federal Act.

C. Reciprocal Compensation

1. Call Termination—Tandem or End Office

MFS Position

MFS requests tandem rate treatment for calls terminated on its network pursuant to the FCC Interconnection Order,¶ 1090, and FCC rule, 47 CFR § 51.711(a)(3). MFS argues that the non-incumbent carrier incurs additional costs in serving customers larger than a single wire center.

MFS states that it will accept the USWC proposed rates for termination if it receives tandem rate treatment for its own switch. if tandem rate treatment is not received for traffic terminated to MFS, MFS would propose reciprocal per minute rates of $0.004 for end office termination and $0.006 for tandem termination.

MFS argues that it need only demonstrate that its switch serve a comparable geographic area to that of USWC. It relies on its hearing testimony regarding the scope of its facilities.

The MFS switch is located in Kirkland, Washington. It is currently collocated in six USWC central offices in the Seattle area. MFS has a fiber ring that includes Lake Washington and connects those six offices. Tr. 124 (Artman). MFS stated at the hearing that its switch is capable of performing tandem functions. Tr. 96 (Artman). MFS expects that the area served by its switch will include metropolitan Seattle and Tacoma, and will include some GTE service areas. Purchase of unbundled links and transport will enable MFS to serve other areas as well.

MFS argues that if it services customers in central and eastern Washington it will have to absorb the cost of construction, leasing, or purchasing unbundled elements to provide facilities.

USWC Position

In resolving this issue, USWC states that the arbitrator must consider whether the MFS switch performs a similar function to the USWC tandem switch and whether it serves a similar geographic area. It is USWC's position that the respective switches are not comparable in either respect. USWC witness Moran stated that the MFS switch might serve five or ten thousand customers located along a concentrated route that may be 50 or 100 miles long, perhaps 60 square miles. By contrast, the USWC tandem network in the comparable area serves 1600 square miles. USWC argues that the sporadic service within an area offered by MFS is not comparable. Moran contrasted the function of a tandem switch, which connects trunks to trunks, with an end-office switch which connects lines to lines, lines to trunks, and performs other functions. USWC argues that the MFS switch is not connected to any trunks and cannot offer USWC this comparable switching functionality. USWC further objects that the effect of the MFS proposal is to preclude it from

having an option of avoiding tandem charges by terminating at an end office.

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, Appendix A, p.1 (Local Call Termination)

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts the USWC proposed rates for end-office termination. The arbitrator adopts the MFS proposal for tandem treatment for its switch.

Discussion

The parties are reasonably close on the issue of call termination and on the proposed rates. Under 47 USC § 252(d)(2), terms and conditions for reciprocal compensation are not to be construed as just and reasonable unless they provide for the mutual and reciprocal recovery of costs of transport and termination. Such costs must be based on a reasonable approximation of the additional costs of terminating such calls. State commissions may not engage in rate regulation proceedings to determine the costs of transport and termination with particularity and may not require carriers to maintain records of the cost of the calls.

MFS has established that its switch is reasonably comparable in geographical scope to a USWC tandem. While there questions about the functional comparability of the MFS switch to a tandem switch, particularly as to trunk to trunk capability, the record supports a conclusion that the MFS switch, like a tandem, performs the function of aggregating traffic from widespread remote locations with low traffic volumes. The record also indicates that, in order to terminate USWC calls on its network, MFS will incur additional costs over costs that would be incurred by simple end-office switch termination. While the MFS position is based on approximations, the Act expressly provides that a "reasonable approximation" of costs is to be the

basis of determinations, and that costs may not be determined with "particularity."

2. Enhanced Service Provider (ESP) Call Termination

MFS Position.

MFS opposes establishing any unique treatment of ESPs in this agreement. MFS argues that there is no basis in the Act or in other applicable law for such a differentiation and that such traffic has not previously been separated or segregated. To date, the FCC has treated ESP traffic like other local traffic. MFS argues that this is appropriate because the traffic is typically local in nature. In MFS' view, USWC is attempting to prejudge issues which will be addressed by the FCC in its access charge reform proceeding.

USWC Position

USWC seeks to exempt any traffic originated or terminated by enhanced service providers from the reciprocal compensation arrangements of the agreement. This position is based on a recognition of the unique status of this traffic, which is currently exempt from paying Part 69 access charges. USWC expects the FCC to address this exemption in its forthcoming access charge reform proceeding. Until that time, USWC believes it is appropriate to exclude ESPs from coverage under the reciprocal compensation provisions.

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, V.D.1.e, p. 12 (Reciprocal Traffic Exchange)

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts the MFS position.

Discussion

It is premature to change the treatment of ESPs at this time.

3. Late Payment Charges

MFS Position

MFS has proposed language for the contract which would assess late payment charges in the event switched access usage data is not submitted in a timely fashion and if, as a result, the receiving party is delayed in billing interexchange carriers. The proposal also provides liability if the data is not submitted within 90 days. The liability provision states:

> In the event the recording party [e.g. USWC] has not submitted such data in the proper format by the 90th day following the original due date, billings for the traffic associated with such traffic will be deemed "lost" and the recording party shall be liable to the receiving party for the amount of the lost billings. JPS, V.K.7, p. 17.

MFS argues that the provision is commercially reasonable and designed to allow parties some confidence in dealing with IXCs or other third parties, that it will protect parties against loss, and that it will ensure compliance with the time frames provided in the agreement.

USWC Position

USWC opposes the MFS provision on the ground that such an arrangement is not currently in place with any other co-carrier (independent LEC) with whom USWC interconnects. USWC argues that the provision is entirely too severe and may cause substantial revenue loss disproportionate to any revenue loss that might occur.

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, V.K.7, p. 17 (Reciprocal Traffic Exchange: Billing Arrangements)

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts the USWC position.

Discussion

While some provision for encouraging timely billing may be appropriate, the "lost billings" provision is unreasonable.

D. Special Construction

The issue of construction charges has been addressed under specific sections above.

E. Interim Number Portability

1. Switched Access Charges

MFS Position

MFS proposes that, for all intra-LATA TOLL and inter-LATA minutes delivered over Interim Number Portability (INP), USWC will pay, in lieu of reciprocal compensation, all terminating switched access elements otherwise due the terminating office provider, including: end-office switching, transport interconnection charge, the carrier common line charge (CCLC), and an appropriate portion of tandem switched transport.

USWC Position

USWC proposes that for all intra-LATA TOLL and inter-LATA minutes delivered over INP, USWC will pay, in addition to reciprocal compensation, the applicable CCLC for each minute.

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, VIII.B.h, pp. 37-38 (Cost Recovery)

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts neither position.

Discussion

The FCC Number Portability order[25] addresses the appropriate treatment of terminating access charges in the interim number portability context. While the FCC generally approves the model of meet-point billing arrangements between neighboring incumbent LECs, it requires incumbent LECs and competitors to share in the access revenues received for a ported call.

The FCC order states:

> "[W]e direct forwarding carriers and terminating carriers to assess on IXCs charges for terminating access through meet-point billing arrangements . . . it is up to the carriers whether they each issue a bill for access to one ported call, or whether one of them issues a bill to the IXCs covering all of the transferred calls and shares the correct portion of the revenues with the other carriers involved." *Id.*

Neither proposal is sufficiently consistent with the FCC order. USWC and MFS should draft a provision incorporating the foregoing requirements. Since the carriers have been unable to agree, the arbitrator determines that the contract should provide that each carrier issue a bill to the IXC for its portion of the access charges, based upon the functions and facilities provided by the carrier for call forwarding or termination. The parties' agreement should take into account the fact that USWC receives compensation for INP costs by means of the Remote Call Forwarding charges discussed below.

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[25] *In the Matter of Telephone Number Portability*, First Report and Order, CC Docket No. 95-116, FCC 96-286 (released July 2, 1996) (FCC Number Portability Order) ¶ 140.

2. Cost Recovery

MFS Position

MFS proposes that the two parties agree to assign between themselves, on an interim basis, interim number portability costs on the basis of active local numbers, recognizing that such assignment necessarily excludes recovery from other industry participants. USWC and MFS would be left free to advocate the assignment of costs to other industry participants as part of the appropriate industry-wide cost recovery method.

USWC Position

USWC takes the position that all of the INP costs identified in the agreement (JPS) should be the responsibility of the "INP Requestor" (i.e. MFS).

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, VIII.B.f, pp. 36-37 (Cost Recovery)

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts the MFS position.

Discussion

Section 251(e)(2) provides that "[t]he cost of establishing telecommunications . . . number portability shall be borne by all telecommunications carriers on a competitively neutral basis as determined by the [FCC]." The FCC Number Portability Order identified a number of approaches for competitively neutral cost recovery, including the apportionment of costs based on number of active telephone numbers.[26] The MFS proposal is, therefore, consistent with the FCC order and with the 1996 Act. The USWC position, however, finds no support in the statute or the FCC order. The FCC order specifically states that a cost recov-

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[26] FCC Number Portability Order, ¶¶ 130, 136.

ery mechanism which places all the costs on the new entrant would not be competitively neutral.[27]

F. Collocation

Parties Positions

a. Quote preparation fee

MFS proposes a nonrecurring quote preparation fee of $1,500.00.

USWC proposes $2,437.30

Neither party discusses the issue in its final briefs.

b. Entrance facility

MFS proposes a recurring fee of $2.07 and a nonrecurring fee of $1,307.45 to be assessed on a per cable basis. USWC proposes the same charges, but would assess them for 2 fibers, rather than on a per cable basis. MFS agrees that the price is appropriate per cable but disputes the limitation as to number of fibers within a cable to be routed to a given collocation space.

c. Installation charges for EICT

MFS objects to the nonrecurring installation charges for cross-connection to collocation equipment. It proposes charges ranging from $100.00 to $300.00, which its says are "reasonable." It also proposes that these charges not apply to unbundled loops where a separate unbundled loop NRC applies.

USWC proposes charges ranging from $339.61 to $433.23. Charges would apply to whether or not a separate unbundled loop NRC applies.

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, Appendix A, p. 3 (Physical and Virtual Collocation)

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[27] *Id.*, ¶ 134, 138.

Arbitration Decision

a. Quote preparation. The arbitrator adopts the USWC position.
b. Entrance facilities. The arbitrator adopts the MFS position.
c. EICT charges. The arbitrator adopts the USWC position as to rates and the MFS position as to applicability of the charge.

Discussion

a. Quote preparation

MFS did not provide a rationale for its proposed figure.

b. Entrance facilities.

The amount of the charge is not in dispute. USWC did not explain, however, the basis for assessing the charge on the basis of number of fibers rather than a per cable basis.

c. EICT

As to rates, MFS provides no support for its recommended charges. MFS makes a reasonable argument, however, that the installation NRC should not apply when another NRC is already chargeable for the same unbundled loop installation.

G. Interconnection Architecture

MFS Position

MFS has requested that interconnection occur initially at the tandem switch. It objects to any requirement that it interconnect initially at the end-office level. MFS acknowledges that end-office interconnection will become appropriate as traffic volumes increase. MFS therefore seeks language in the agreement's definition of "Routing Point" as follows: "The Rating Point/Routing Point need not be the same as the rate center point, nor must it be located within the rate center area, but must be in the same LATA as the NPA/NXX."

USWC Position

USWC opposes inclusion of this language on the ground that it could have the effect of requiring USWC to provide substantial transport on a local call between USWC and MFS customers located in close proximity. USWC believes it is appropriate to establish "points of interface" (POIs) for local traffic within the associated USWC local calling area.

Contract Provision(s)

JPS, III.RR, p. 7 (Definitions)

Arbitration Decision

The arbitrator adopts the MFS position.

Discussion

The 1996 Act provides that incumbent LECs have the duty to provide for interconnection "at any technically feasible point within the carrier's network. 47 USC § 251(c)(2)(B). The FCC Interconnection Order interprets this provision as giving "competing carriers the right to deliver traffic terminating on an incumbent LEC's network at any technically feasible point on that network, rather than obligating such carriers to transport traffic to less convenient or efficient interconnection points." *FCC Interconnection Order*, ¶ 209. The FCC went on to identify a minimum list of technically feasible interconnection points, including the tandem switch. *Id.*, ¶ 210. The burden of proof is on the incumbent LEC to demonstrate that interconnection at a particular point is not technically feasible. *Id.*, ¶ 211. These requirements were incorporated in the FCC rules. 47 CFR § 51.305(a)(2) and (e). USWC does not argue that the interconnection sought by MFS is not technically feasible.

III. IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

Pursuant to section 252(c)(3), the arbitrator is to "provide a schedule for implementation of the terms and conditions by the parties to the agreement." In this case, the arbitrator adopts the

implementation schedule set forth in the Joint Position Statement, Section XXXIII, p. 82.

IV. CONCLUSION

The foregoing resolution of the disputed issues in this matter meets the requirements of 47 USC § 252(c).

The parties are directed to submit an agreement consistent with the terms of this report to the Commission for approval within 30 days, pursuant to the following requirements of the Interpretive and Policy Statement:[28]

Filing and Service of Agreements for Approval

1. An interconnection agreement shall be submitted to the Commission for approval under Section 252(e) within 30 days after the issuance of the Arbitrators's Report, in the case of arbitrated agreements, or, in the case of negotiated agreements, within 30 days after the execution of the agreement. The 30 day deadline may be extended by the Commission for good cause. The Commission does not interpret the 9 month time line for arbitration under Section 252(b)(4)(C) as including the approval process.

2. Requests for approval shall be filed with the Secretary of the Commission in the manner provided for in WAC 480-09-120. In addition, the request for approval shall be served on all parties who have requested service (List available from the Commission Records Center. See Section II.A.2 of the Interpretive and Policy Statement) by delivery on the day of filing. The service rules of the Commission set forth in WAC 480-09-120 and 420 apply except as modified in this interpretive order or by

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[28] *In the Matter of Implementation of Certain Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Docket No. UT-960269, Interpretive and Policy Statement Regarding Negotiation, Mediation, Arbitration, and Approval of Agreements Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (June 27, 1996) ("Interpretive and Policy Statement").

the Commission or arbitrator. Unless filed jointly by all parties, the request for approval and any accompanying materials should be served on the other signatories by delivery on the day of filing.

3. A request for approval shall include the documentation set out in this paragraph. The materials can be filed jointly or separately by the parties to the agreement, but should all be filed by the 30 day deadline set out in paragraph 1 above.

Negotiated Agreements

a. A "request for approval" in the form of a brief or memorandum summarizing the main provisions of the agreement, setting forth the party's position as to whether the agreement should be adopted or modified, including a statement as to why the agreement does not discriminate against non-party carriers, is consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity, and is consistent with applicable state law requirements, including Commission interconnection orders.

b. A complete copy of the signed agreement, including any attachments or appendices.

c. A proposed form of order containing findings and conclusions.

Arbitrated Agreements

a. A "request for approval" in the form of a brief or memorandum summarizing the main provisions of the agreement, setting forth the party's position as to whether the agreement should be adopted or modified; and containing a separate explanation of the manner in which the agreement meets each of the applicable specific requirements of Sections 251 and 252, including the FCC regulations thereunder, and applicable state requirements, including Commission interconnection orders. The "request for approval" brief may reference or incorporate previously filed briefs or memoranda. Copies should be at-

tached to the extent necessary for the convenience of the Commission.

b. A complete copy of the signed agreement, including any attachments or appendices.

c. Complete and specific information to enable the Commission to make the determinations required by Section 252(d) regarding pricing standards, including but not limited to supporting information for (1) the cost basis for rates for interconnection and network elements and the profit component of the proposed rate. (2) transport and termination charges; and (3) wholesale prices.

d. A proposed form of order containing findings and conclusions.

Combination Agreements (Arbitrated/Negotiated)

a. Any agreement containing both arbitrated and negotiated provisions shall include the foregoing materials as appropriate, depending on whether a provision is negotiated or arbitrated. The memorandum should clearly identify which sections were negotiated and which arbitrated.

b. A proposed form of order is required, as above.

4. Any filing not containing the required materials will be rejected and must be refiled when complete. The statutory time lines will be deemed not to begin until a request has been properly filed.

Confidentiality

1. Requests for approval and accompanying documentation are subject to the Washington public disclosure law, including the availability of protective orders. The Commission interprets 47 USC § 252(h) to require that the entire agreement approved by the Commission must be made available for public inspection and copying. For this reason, the Commission will ordinar-

ily expect that proposed agreements submitted with a request for approval will not be entitled to confidential treatment.

2. If a party or parties wishes protection for appendices or other materials accompanying a request for approval, the party shall obtain a resolution of the confidentiality issues, including a request for a protective order and the necessary signatures (Exhibits A or B to standard protective order) prior to filing the request for approval itseif with the Commission.

Approval Procedure

1. The request will be assigned to the Commission Staff for review and presentation of a recommendation at the Commission public meeting. The Commission does not interpret the approval process as an adjudicative proceeding under the Washington Administrative Procedure Act. Staff who participated in the mediation process for the agreement will not be assigned to review the agreement.

2. Any person wishing to comment on the request for approval may do so by filing written comments with the Commission no later than 10 days after date of request for approval. Comments shall be served on all parties to the agreement under review. Parties to the agreement file written responses to comments within 7 days of service.

3. The request for approval will be considered at a public meeting of the Commission. Any person may appear at the public meeting to comment on the request for approval. The Commission may in its discretion set the matter for consideration at a special public meeting.

4. The Commission will enter an order, containing findings and conclusions, approving or rejecting the interconnection agreement within 30 days of request for approval in the case of arbitrated agreements, or within 90 days in the case of negotiated agreements. Agreements containing both arbitrated and

negotiated provisions will be treated as arbitrated agreements subject to the 30 day approval deadline specified in the Act.

Fees and Costs

1. Each party shall be responsible for bearing its own fees and costs. Each party shall pay any fees imposed by Commission rule or statute.

DATED at Olympia, Washington and effective this 8th day of November 1996.

WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND
TRANSPORTATION
COMMISSION

/s/ Simon J. Ffitch
SIMON J. FFITCH
Arbitrator

APPENDIX E

[Filed Jan. 12, 2000]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-35146
D.C. No. CV-97-00222-WLD

US WEST COMMUNICATIONS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MFS INTELENET, INC; ANNE LEVINSON, Chairperson; RICHARD HEMSTAD, Commissioner; WILLIAM P. GILLIS, Commissioner, in their official capacities as Commissioners of the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission; and WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,
Defendants-Appellees.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Amicus curiae.

ORDER

Before: BROWNING and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges, and SHADUR[1], District Judge.

Appellant U S West's motion for leave to file reply in support of petition for rehearing en banc is granted. The brief received December 15, 1999, is ordered filed.

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[1] The Honorable Milton I. Shadur, Senior United States District Judge, Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

The panel as constituted above has voted to deny the petition for rehearing. Judges Browning and Hawkins voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc, and Judge Shadur so recommended.

The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc and no active judge has requested a vote whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R. App. P. 35.

The petition for rehearing and the petition for rehearing en banc are denied.

APPENDIX F

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

47 U.S.C. § 251. INTERCONNECTION.

(a) GENERAL DUTY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIERS.—Each telecommunications carrier has the duty—

(1) to interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications carriers; and

(2) not to install network features, functions, or capabilities that do not comply with the guidelines and standards established pursuant to section 255 or 256.

(b) OBLIGATIONS OF ALL LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIERS.—Each local exchange carrier has the following duties:

(1) RESALE.—The duty not to prohibit, and not to impose unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or limitations on, the resale of its telecommunications services.

(2) NUMBER PORTABILITY.—The duty to provide, to the extent technically feasible, number portability in accordance with requirements prescribed by the Commission.

(3) DIALING PARITY.—The duty to provide dialing parity to competing providers of telephone exchange service and telephone toll service, and the duty to permit all such providers to have nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers, operator services, directory assistance, and directory listing, with no unreasonable dialing delays.

(4) ACCESS TO RIGHTS-OF-WAY.—The duty to afford access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way of such carrier to competing providers of telecommunications services on rates, terms, and conditions that are consistent with section 224.

(5) RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION.—The duty to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport and termination of telecommunications.

(c) ADDITIONAL OBLIGATION OF INCUMBENT LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIERS.—In addition to the duties contained in subsection (b), each incumbent local exchange carrier has the following duties:

(1) DUTY TO NEGOTIATE.—The duty to negotiate in good faith in accordance with section 252 the particular terms and conditions of agreements to fulfill the duties described in paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (b) and this subsection. The requesting telecommunications carrier also has the duty to negotiate in good faith the terms and conditions of such agreements.

(2) INTERCONNECTION.—The duty to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the local exchange carrier's network—

(A) for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and exchange access;

(B) at any technically feasible point within the carrier's network;

(C) that is at least equal in quality to that provided by the local exchange carrier to itself or to any subsidiary, affiliate, or any other party to which the carrier provides interconnection; and

(D) on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section and section 252.

(3) UNBUNDLED ACCESS.—The duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the provision of

a telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement and the requirements of this section and section 252. An incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service.

(4) RESALE.—The duty—

(A) to offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications service that the carrier provides at retail to subscribers who are not telecommunications carriers; and

(B) not to prohibit, and not to impose unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or limitations on, the resale of such telecommunications service, except that a State commission may, consistent with regulations prescribed by the Commission under this section, Prohibit a reseller that obtains at wholesale rates a telecommunications service that is available at retail only to a category of subscribers from offering such to a different category of subscribers.

(5) NOTICE OF CHANGES.—The duty to provide reasonable public notice of changes in the information necessary for the transmission and routing of services using that local exchange carrier's facilities or networks, as well as of any other changes that would affect the interoperability of those facilities and networks.

(6) COLLOCATION.—The duty to provide, on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, for physical collocation of equipment nec-

essary for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements at the premises of the local exchange carrier, except that the carrier may provide for virtual collocation if the local exchange carrier demonstrates to the State commission that physical collocation is not practical for technical reasons or because of space limitations.

(d) IMPLEMENTATION.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Within 6 months after the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Commission shall complete all actions necessary to establish regulations to implement the requirements of this section.

(2) ACCESS STANDARDS.—In determining what network elements should be made available for purposes of subsection (c)(3), the Commission shall consider, at a minimum, whether—

(A) access to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary; and

(B) the failure to provide access to such network elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services that it seeks to offer.

(3) PRESERVATION OF STATE ACCESS REGULATIONS.—In prescribing and enforcing regulations to implement the requirements of this section, the Commission shall not preclude the enforcement of any regulation, order, or policy of a State commission that—

(A) establishes access and interconnection obligations of local exchange carriers;

(B) is consistent with the requirements of this section; and

(C) does not substantially prevent implementation of the requirements of this section and the purposes of this part.

(e) NUMBERING ADMINISTRATION.—

(1) COMMISSION AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION.—The Commission shall create or designate one or more impartial entities to administer telecommunications numbering and to make such numbers available on an equitable basis. The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction over those portions of the North American Numbering Plan that pertain to the United States. Nothing in this paragraph shall preclude the Commission from delegating to State commissions or other entities all or any portion of such jurisdiction.

(2) COSTS.—The cost of establishing telecommunications numbering administration arrangements and number portability shall be borne by all telecommunications carriers on a competitively neutral basis as determined by the Commission.

(f) EXEMPTIONS, SUSPENSIONS, AND MODIFICATIONS.—

(1) EXEMPTION FOR CERTAIN RURAL TELEPHONE COMPANIES—

(A) EXEMPTION.—Subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to a rural telephone company until (i) such company has received a bona fide request for interconnection, services, or network elements, and (ii) the State commission determines (under subparagraph (B)) that such request is not unduly economically burdensome, is technically feasible, and is consistent with section 254 (other than subsections (b)(7) and (c)(1)(D) thereof).

(B) STATE TERMINATION OF EXEMPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE.—The party making a

bona fide request of a rural telephone company for interconnection, services, or network elements shall submit a notice of its request to the State commission. The State commission shall conduct an inquiry for the purpose of determining whether to terminate the exemption under subparagraph (A). Within 120 days after the State commission receives notice of the request, the State commission shall terminate the exemption if the request is not unduly economically burdensome, is technically feasible, and is consistent with section 254 (other than subsections (b)(7) and (c)(1)(D) thereof). Upon termination of the exemption, a State commission shall establish an implementation schedule for compliance with the request that is consistent in time and manner with Commission regulations.

(C) LIMITATION ON EXEMPTION.—The exemption provided by this paragraph shall not apply with respect to a request under subsection (c) from a cable operator providing video programming, and seeking to provide any telecommunication service, in the area in which the rural telephone company provides video programming. The limitation contained in this subparagraph shall not apply to a rural telephone company that is providing video programming on the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

(2) SUSPENSIONS AND MODIFICATIONS FOR RURAL CARRIERS.—A local exchange carrier with fewer than 2 percent of the Nation's subscriber lines installed in the aggregate nationwide may petition a State for a suspension or modification of the application of a requirement or requirement of subsection (b) or (c) to telephone exchange service facilities specified in such petition. The State commission shall grant such petition to the extent that,

and for such duration as, the State commission determines that such suspension or modification—

(A) is necessary—

(i) to avoid a significant adverse economic impact on users of telecommunications services generally;

(ii) to avoid imposing a requirement that is unduly economically burdensome; or

(iii) to avoid imposing a requirement that is technically infeasible; and

(B) is consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.

The State commission shall act upon any petition filed under this paragraph within 180 days after receiving such petition. Pending such action, the State commission may suspend enforcement of the requirements or requirements to which the petition applies with respect to the petition carrier or carriers.

(g) CONTINUED ENFORCEMENT OF EXCHANGE ACCESS AND INTERCONNECTION REQUIREMENTS.—On and after the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, each local exchange carrier, to the extent that it provides wireline services shall provide exchange access, information access, and exchange services for such access to interexchange carriers and information service providers in accordance with the same equal access and nondiscriminatory interconnection restrictions and obligations (including receipt of compensation) that apply to such carriers on the date immediately preceding the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 under any court order, consent decree, or regulation, order, or policy of the Commission, until such restrictions and obligations are explicitly superseded by regulations prescribed by the Commission

after such date of enactment. During the period beginning on such date of enactment and until such restrictions and obligations are so superseded, such restrictions and obligations shall be enforceable in the same manner as regulations of the Commission.

(h) DEFINITION OF INCUMBENT LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIER.—

(1) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this section, the term "incumbent local exchange carrier" means, with respect to an area, the local exchange carrier that—

(A) on the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, provided telephone exchange service in such area; and

(B) (i) on such date of enactment, was deemed to be a member of the exchange carrier association pursuant to section 69.601(b) of the Commission's regulations (47 C.F.R. 69. 601(b)); or

(ii) is a person or entity that, on or after such date of enactment, became a successor or assign of a member described in clause (i).

(2) TREATMENT OF COMPARABLE CARRIERS AS INCUMBENTS.—The Commission may, by rule, provide for the treatment of a local exchange carrier (or class or category thereof) as an incumbent local exchange carrier for purposes of this section if—

(A) such carrier occupies a position in the market for telephone exchange service within an area that is comparable to the position occupied by a carrier described in paragraph (1);

(B) such carrier has substantially replaced an incumbent local exchange carrier described in paragraph (1); and

(C) such treatment is consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity and the purposes of this section.

(i) SAVINGS PROVISION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or otherwise affect the Commission's authority under section 201.

47 U.S.C. § 252. PROCEDURES FOR NEGOTIATION, ARBITRATION, AND APPROVAL OF AGREEMENTS.

(a) AGREEMENTS ARRIVED AT THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.—

(1) VOLUNTARY NEGOTIATIONS.—Upon receiving a request for interconnection, services, or network elements pursuant to section 251, an incumbent local exchange carrier may negotiate and enter into a binding agreement with the requesting telecommunications carrier or carriers without regard to the standards set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 251. The agreement shall include a detailed schedule of itemized charges for interconnection and each service or network element included in the agreement. The agreement, including any interconnection agreement negotiated before the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, shall be submitted to the State commission under subsection (e) of this section.

(2) MEDIATION.—Any party negotiating an agreement under this section may, at any point in the negotiation, ask a State commission to participate in the negotiation and to mediate any differences arising in the course of the negotiation.

(b) AGREEMENTS ARRIVED AT THROUGH COMPULSORY ARBITRATION.—

(1) ARBITRATION.—During the period from the 135th to the 160th day (inclusive) after the date on which an incumbent local exchange receives a request for negotiation

under this section, the carrier or any other party to the negotiation may petition a State commission to arbitrate any open issues.

(2) DUTY OF PETITIONER.—

(A) A party that petitions a State commission under paragraph (1) shall, at the same time as it submits the petition, provide the State commission all relevant documentation concerning—

(i) the unresolved issues;

(ii) the position of each of the parties with respect to those issues; and

(iii) any other issue discussed and resolved by the parties.

(B) A party petitioning a State commission under paragraph (1) shall provide a copy of the petition and any documentation to the other party or parties not later than the day on which the State commission receives the petition.

(3) OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND.—A non-petitioning party to a negotiation under this section may respond to the other party's petition and provide such additional information as it wishes within 25 days after the State commission receives the petition.

(4) ACTION BY THE STATE COMMISSION.—

(A) The State commission shall limit its consideration of any petition under paragraph (1) (and any response thereto) to the issues set forth in the petition and in the response, if any, filed under paragraph (3).

(B) The State commission may require the petitioning party and the responding party to provide

such information as may be necessary for the State commission to reach a decision on the unresolved issues. If any party refuses or fails unreasonably to respond on a timely basis to any reasonable request from the State commission, then the State commission may proceed on the basis of the best information available to it from whatever source derived.

(C) The State commission shall resolve each issue set forth on the petition and the response, if any, by imposing appropriate conditions as required to implement subsection (c) upon the parties to the agreement, and shall conclude the resolution of any unresolved issues not later than 9 months after the date on which the local exchange carrier received the request under this section.

(5) REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE.—The refusal of any other party to the negotiate to participate further in the negotiations, to cooperate with the State commission in carrying out its function as an arbitrator, or to continue to negotiate in good faith in the presence, or with the assistance, of the State commission shall be considered a failure to negotiate in good faith.

(c) STANDARDS FOR ARBITRATION.—In resolving by arbitration under subsection (b) any open issues and imposing conditions upon the parties to the agreement, a State commission shall—

(1) ensure that such resolution and conditions meet the requirements of section 251, including the regulations prescribed by the Commission pursuant to section 251;

(2) establish any rates for interconnection, services, or network elements according to subsection (d); and

(3) provide a schedule for implementation of the terms and conditions by the parties to the agreement.

(d) PRICING STANDARDS.—

(1) INTERCONNECTION AND NETWORK ELEMENT CHARGES.—Determinations by a State commission of the just and reasonable rate for the interconnection of facilities and equipment for purposes of subsection (c)(2) of section 251, and the just and reasonable rate for network elements for purposes of subsection (c)(3) of such section—

(A) shall be—

(i) based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based proceeding the interconnection or network element (whichever is applicable), and

(ii) nondiscriminatory, and

(B) may include a reasonable profit.

(2) CHARGES FOR TRANSPORT AND TERMINATION OF TRAFFIC.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—For the purposes of compliance by an incumbent local exchange carrier with section 251(b)(5), a State commission shall not consider the terms and conditions for reciprocal compensation to be just and reasonable unless—

(i) such terms and conditions provide for the mutual and reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs associated with the transport and termination on each carrier's network facilities of calls that originate on the network facilities of the carriers; and

(ii) such terms and conditions determine such costs on the basis of a reasonable approximation of the additional costs of terminating such calls.

(B) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—This paragraph shall not be construed—

(i) to preclude arrangements that afford the mutual recovery of costs through the offsetting of reciprocal obligations, including arrangements that waive mutual recovery (such as bill-and-keep arrangements); or

(ii) to authorize the Commission or any State commission to engage in any rate regulation proceeding to establish with particularity the additional costs of transporting or terminating calls, or to require carriers to maintain records with respect to the additional costs of such calls.

(3) WHOLESALE PRICES FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES.—For the purposes of section 251(c)(4), a State commission shall determine wholesale rates on the basis of retail rates charged to subscribers for the telecommunications service requested, excluding the portion thereof attributable to any marketing, billing, collection, and other costs that will be avoided by the local exchange carrier.

(e) APPROVAL BY STATE COMMISSION.—

(1) APPROVAL REQUIRED.—Any interconnection agreement adopted by negotiation or arbitration shall be submitted for approval to the State commission. A State commission to which an agreement is submitted shall approve or reject the agreement, with written findings as to any deficiencies.

(2) GROUNDS FOR REJECTION.—The State commission may only reject—

(A) an agreement (or any portion thereof) adopted by negotiation under subsection (a) if it finds that—

(i) the agreement (or portion thereof) discriminates against a telecommunications carrier not a party to the agreement; or

(ii) the implementation of such agreement or portion is not consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity; or

(B) an agreement (or any portion thereof) adopted by arbitration under subsection (b) if it finds that the agreement does not meet the requirements of section 251, including the regulations prescribed by the Commission pursuant to section 251, or the standards set forth in subsection (d) of this section.

(3) PRESERVATION OF AUTHORITY.—Notwithstanding paragraph (2) but subject to section 253, nothing in this section shall prohibit a State commission from establishing or enforcing other requirements of State law in its review of an agreement, including requiring compliance with intrastate telecommunications service quality standards or requirements.

(4) SCHEDULE FOR DECISION.—If the State commission does not act to approve or reject the agreement within 90 days after submission by the parties of an agreement adopted by negotiation under subsection (a), or within 30 days after submission by the parties of an agreement adopted by arbitration under subsection (b), the agreement shall be deemed approved. No State court shall have jurisdiction to review the action of a State commission in approving or rejecting an agreement under this section.

(5) COMMISSION TO ACT IF STATE WILL NOT ACT.—If a State commission fails to act to carry out its responsibility under this section in any proceeding or other matter under this section, then the Commission shall issue an order preempting the State commission's jurisdiction of that proceeding or matter within 90 days after being notified (or taking notice) of such failure, and shall assume the responsibility of the State commission under this section with respect to the proceeding or matter and act for the State commission.

(6) REVIEW OF STATE COMMISSION ACTIONS.—In a case in which a State fails to act as described in paragraph (5), the proceeding by the commission under such paragraph and any judicial review of the Commission's actions shall be the exclusive remedies for s State commission's failure to act. In any case in which a State commission makes a determination under this section, any party aggrieved by such determination may bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to determine whether the agreement or statement meets the requirements of section 251 and this section.

(f) STATEMENTS OF GENERALLY AVAILABLE TERMS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—A Bell operating company may prepare and file with a State commission a statement of the terms and conditions that such company generally offers within that State to comply with the requirements of section 251 and the regulations thereunder and the standards applicable under this section.

(2) STATE COMMISSION REVIEW.—A State commission may not approve such statement unless such statement complies with subsection (d) of this section and section 251 and the regulations thereunder. Except as provided in section 253, nothing in this section shall prohibit a State commission from establishing or enforcing other require-

ments of State law in its review or enforcing other requirements of State law in its review of such statement, including requiring compliance with intrastate telecommunications service quality standards or requirements.

(3) SCHEDULE FOR REVIEW.—The State commission to which a statement is submitted, not later than 60 days after the date of such submission—

(A) complete the review of such statement under paragraph (2) (including any reconsideration thereof), unless the submitting carrier agrees to an extension of the period for review ; or

(B) permit such statement to take effect.

(4) AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE REVIEW.—Paragraph (3) shall not preclude the State commission from continuing to review a statement that has been permitted to take effect under subparagraph (B) of such paragraph or from approving or disapproving such statement under paragraph (2).

(5) DUTY TO NEGOTIATE NOT AFFECTED.—The submission or approval of a statement under this subsection shall not relieve a Bell operating company of its duty to negotiate the terms and conditions of an agreement under section 251.

(g) CONSOLIDATION OF STATE PROCEEDINGS.—Where not inconsistent with the requirements of this Act, a State commission may, to the extent practical, consolidate proceedings under sections 214(e), 251(f), 253, and this section in order to reduce administrative burdens on telecommunications carriers, other parties to the proceedings, and the State commission in carrying out its responsibilities under this Act.

(h) FILING REQUIRED.—A State commission shall make a copy of each agreement approved under subsection (e) and each statement approved under subsection (f) available for public in-

spection and copying within 10 days after the agreement or statement is approved. The State commission may charge a reasonable and non-discriminatory fee to the parties to the agreement or to the party filing the statement to cover the costs of approving and filing such agreement or statement.

(i) AVAILABILITY TO OTHER TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIERS.—A local exchange carrier shall make available any interconnection, service or network element provided under an agreement approved under this section to which it is a party to any other requesting telecommunications carrier upon the same terms and conditions as those provided in the agreement.

(j) DEFINITION OF INCUMBENT LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIER.—For purposes of this section, the term "incumbent local exchange carrier" has the meaning provided in section 251(h).

47 U.S.C. § 260. PROVISION OF TELEMESSAGING SERVICE.

(a) NONDISCRIMINATION SAFEGUARDS.—Any local exchange carrier subject to the requirements of section 251(c) that provides telemessaging service—

(1) shall not subsidize its telemessaging service directly or indirectly from its telephone exchange service or its exchange access; and

(2) shall not prefer or discriminate in favor of its telemessaging service operations in its provision of telecommunications services.

(b) EXPEDITED CONSIDERATION OF COMPLAINTS.—The Commission shall establish procedures for the receipt and review of complaints concerning violations of subsection (a) or the regulations thereunder that result in material financial harm to a provider of telemessaging service. Such procedures shall ensure that the Commission will make a final determination with respect to any such complaint within 120 days after receipt of the complaint. If the complaint contains an appropriate

showing that the alleged violation occurred, the Commission shall, within 60 days after receipt of the complaint, order the local exchange carrier and any affiliates to cease engaging in such violation pending such final determination.

(c) DEFINITION.—As used in this section, the term "telemessaging service" means voice mail and voice storage and retrieval services, any live operator services used to record, transcribe, or relay messages (other than telecommunications relay services), and any ancillary services offered in combination with these services.

47 U.S.C. § 261. EFECT ON OTHER REQUIREMENTS.

(a) COMMISSION REGULATIONS.—Nothing in this part shall be construed to prohibit the Commission from enforcing regulations prescribed prior to the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in fulfilling the requirements of this part, to the extent that such regulations are not inconsistent with the provisions of this part.

(b) EXISTING STATE REGULATIONS.—Nothing in this part shall be construed to prohibit any State commission from enforcing regulations prescribed prior to the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, or from prescribing regulations after such date of enactment, in fulfilling the requirements of this part, if such regulations are not inconsistent with the provisions of this part.

(c) ADDITIONAL STATE REQUIREMENTS.—Nothing in this part precludes a State from imposing requirements on a telecommunications carrier for intrastate services that are necessary to further competition in the provision of telephone exchange service or exchange access, as long as the State's requirements are not inconsistent with this part or the Commission's regulations to implement this part.

28 U.S.C. § 2342. Jurisdiction of court of appeals

The court of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of—

(1) all final orders of the Federal Communications Commission made reviewable by section 402(a) of title 47;

(2) all final orders of the Secretary of Agriculture made under chapters 9 and 20A of title 7, except orders issued under sections 210(e), 217a, and 499g(a) of title 7;

(3) all rules, regulations, or final orders of—

(A) the Secretary of Transportation issued pursuant to section 2, 9, 37, 41, or 43 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (46 U.S.C.App. 802, 803, 808, 839, and 841a); and

(B) the Federal Maritime Commission issued pursuant to—

(i) section 23, 25, or 43 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (46 U.S.C.App. 822, 824, or 841a);

(ii) section 19 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920 (46 U.S.C.App. 876);

(iii) section 2, 3, 4, or 5 of the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933 (46 U.S.C.App. 844, 845, 845a, or 845b);

(iv) section 14 or 17 of the Shipping Act of 1984 (46 U.S.C.App. 1713 or 1716); or

(v) section 2(d) or 3(d) of the Act of November 6, 1966 (46 U.S.C.App. 817d(d) or 817e(d)[1];

(4) all final orders of the Atomic Energy Commission made reviewable by section 2239 of title 42;

(5) all rules, regulations, or final orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission made reviewable by section 2321 of this title and all final orders of such Commission made reviewable under section 11901(j)(2) of title 49, United States Code;

(6) all final orders under section 812 of the Fair Housing Act; and

(7) all final agency actions described in section 202(f) of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970.

Jurisdiction is invoked by filing a petition as provided by section 2344 of this title.

28 U.S.C. § 2343. Venue

The venue of a proceeding under this chapter is in the judicial circuit in which the petitioner resides or has its principal office, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

28 U.S.C. § 2344. Review of orders; time; notice; contents of petition; service

On the entry of a final order reviewable under this chapter, the agency shall promptly give notice thereof by service or publication in accordance with its rules. Any party aggrieved by the final order may, within 60 days after its entry, file a petition to review the order in the court of appeals wherein venue lies. The

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[1] So in original. Probably should be followed by a closing parenthesis.

action shall be against the United States. The petition shall contain a concise statement of—

(1) the nature of the proceedings as to which review is sought;

(2) the facts on which venue is based;

(3) the grounds on which relief is sought; and

(4) the relief prayed.

The petitioner shall attach to the petition, as exhibits, copies of the order, report, or decision of the agency. The clerk shall serve a true copy of the petition on the agency and on the Attorney General by registered mail, with requests for a return receipt.

28 U.S.C. § 2347. Petitions to review; proceedings

(a) Unless determined on a motion to dismiss, petitions to review orders reviewable under this chapter are heard in the court of appeals on the record of the pleadings, evidence adduced, and proceedings before the agency, when the agency has held a hearing whether or not required to do so by law.

(b) When the agency has not held a hearing before taking the action of which review is sought by the petition, the court of appeals shall determine whether a hearing is required by law. After that determination, the court shall—

(1) remand the proceedings to the agency to hold a hearing, when a hearing is required by law;

(2) pass on the issues presented, when a hearing is not required by law and it appears from the pleadings and affidavits filed by the parties that no genuine issue of material fact is presented; or

(3) transfer the proceedings to a district court for the district in which the petitioner resides or has its principal office for a hearing and determination as if the proceed-

ings were originally initiated in the district court, when a hearing is not required by law and a genuine issue of material fact is presented. The procedure in these cases in the district court is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(c) If a party to a proceeding to review applies to the court of appeals in which the proceeding is pending for leave to adduce additional evidence and shows to the satisfaction of the court that—

(1) the additional evidence is material; and

(2) there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce the evidence before the agency:

the court may order the additional evidence and any counter-evidence the opposite party desires to offer to be taken by the agency. The agency may modify its findings of fact, or make new findings, by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and may modify or set aside its order, and shall file in the court the additional evidence, the modified findings or new findings, and the modified order or the order setting aside the original order.

28 U.S.C. § 2348: Representation in proceeding; intervention

The Attorney General is responsible for and has control of the interest of the Government in all court proceedings under this chapter. The agency, and any party in interest in the proceeding before the agency whose interest will be affected if an order of the agency is or is not enjoined, set aside, or suspended, may appear as parties thereto of their own motion and as of right, and be represented by counsel in any proceeding to review the order. Communities, associations, corporations, firms, and individuals, whose interests are affected by the order of the agency, may intervene in any proceeding to review the order. The Attorney General may not dispose of or discontinue the proceeding to review over the objection of any party or intervenor, but any inter-

venor may prosecute, defend, or continue the proceeding unaffected by the action or inaction of the Attorney General.

28 U.S.C. § 2349. Jurisdiction of the proceeding

(a) The court of appeals has jurisdiction of the proceeding on the filing and service of a petition to review. The court of appeals in which the record on review is filed, on the filing, has jurisdiction to vacate stay orders or interlocutory injunctions previously granted by any court, and has exclusive jurisdiction to make and enter, on the petition, evidence, and proceedings set forth in the record on review, a judgment determining the validity of, and enjoining, setting aside, or suspending, in whole or in part, the order of the agency.

(b) The filing of the petition to review does not of itself stay or suspend the operation of the order of the agency, but the court of appeals in its discretion may restrain or suspend, in whole or in part, the operation of the order pending the final hearing and determination of the petition. When the petitioner makes application for an interlocutory injunction restraining or suspending the enforcement, operation, or execution of, or setting aside, in whole or in part, any order reviewable under this chapter, at least 5 days' notice of the hearing thereon shall be given to the agency and to the Attorney General. In a case in which irreparable damage would otherwise result to the petitoner, the court of appeals may, on hearing, after reasonable notice to the agency and to the Attorney General, order a temporary stay or suspension in whole or in part, of the operation of the order of the agency for not more than 60 days from the date of the order pending the hearing on the application for the interlocutory injunction, in which case the order of the court of appeals shall contain a specific finding, based on evidence submitted to the court of appeals, and identified by reference thereto, that irreparable damage would result to the petitioner and specifying the nature of the damage. The court of appeals, at the time of hearing the applicaton for an interlocutory injunction, on a like find-

ing, may continue the temporary stay or suspension, in whole or in part, until decision on the application.

47 C.F.R § 51.315

§ 51.315 Combination of unbundled network elements.

(a) An incumbent LEC shall provide unbundled network elements in a manner that allows requesting telecommunications carriers to combine such network elements in order to provide a telecommunications service.

(b) Except upon request, an incumbent LEC shall not separate requested network elements that the incumbent LEC currently combines.

(c) Upon request, an incumbent LEC shall perform the functions necessary to combine unbundled network elements in any manner, even of those elements are not ordinarily combined in the incumbent LEC's network, provided that such combination is:

(1) Technically feasible; and

(2) Would not impair the ability of other carriers to obtain access to unbundled network elements or to interconnect with the incumbent LEC's network.

(d) Upon request, an incumbent LEC shall perform the functions necessary to combine unbundled network elements with elements possessed by the requesting telecommunications carrier in any technically feasible manner.

(e) An incumbent LEC that denies a request to combine elements pursuant to paragraph (c)(1) or paragraph (d) of this section must prove to the state commission that the requested combination is not technically feasible.

(f) An incumbent LEC that denies a request to combine elements pursuant to paragraph (c)(2) of this section must prove to the state commission that the requested combination would im-

pair the ability of other carriers to obtain access to unbundled network elements or to interconnect with the incumbent LEC's network.

APPENDIX G

[Filed June 10, 1999]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-3321/3406/3410/3414/3416/3418/3424/3430/3436/3444/3450/3453/3460/3507/3520/3603/3604/3608/3696/3708/3709/3756/3901/3906/3982/3274

Iowa Utilities Board,

Petitioner,

v.

FCC, et.al,

Respondents.

On Remand From the Supreme Court of the United States

Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, BOWMAN and HANSON, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

This case has been reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further consideration by the Supreme Court of the United States, *see AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,* 525 U.S. ____, 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999), and the parties have filed numerous motions and suggestions as to how this court should now proceed, The court, having carefully considered the Supreme Court's opinion and the pending matters, now enters the following order.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1. That portion of this court's judgment of July 18, 1997, as amended on rehearing October 14, 1997, and reported at

120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997)(hereafter "judgment"), which vacated the FCC's pricing rules found at 47 C.F.R. § 51.501-51.515 (inclusive), §51.601-51.611 (inclusive), and §51.701-51.717 (inclusive) is vacated. The previously vacated pricing rules, including those establishing "proxy prices" are reinstated. The court's previously issued mandate is amended accordingly.

2. That portion of the judgment which vacated 47 C.F.R. §51.089 (the "pick and choose" rule) is vacated, and the "pick and choose" rule is reinstated. The court's previously issued mandate is amended accordingly.

3. Those portions of the judgment which vacated 47 C.F.R. §51.303 (a rule regarding state commission review of preexisting interconnection agreements) and 47 C.F.R. §51.405 (a rule regarding rural exemptions) are vacated, and the cited rules are reinstated. The court's previously issued mandate is amended accordingly.

4. Pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court, 47 C.F.R. § 51.319 is vacated. See 119 S. Ct. at 736. This court's previously issued mandate is amended accordingly.

5. That portion of the judgment which vacated 47 C.F.R. § 51.315(b) is vacated, and the cited rule is reinstated. The court's previously issued mandate is amended accordingly.

6. That portion of the judgment which vacated paragraphs 121-128 of the FCC's *First Report and Order* dealing with the FCC's authority under Section 208 is vacated because the Supreme Court held that the issues were not ripe for this court's review, and those previously vacated paragraphs are reinstated. The court's previously issued mandate is amended accordingly.

7. The following schedule for the briefing and oral argument of those issues remaining and as yet undisposed of is established:

a. Friday, July 16, 1999

Petitioners' and Supporting Intervenors' supplemental opening briefs are due on the remaining issues not reached in this court's first opinion, including the continuing validity and potential disposition of 47 C.F.R. § 51.317. The briefs should also address whether or not, in light of the Supreme Court's decision, this court should take any further action with respect to §§ 51.305(a)(4) and 51.311(c) (the "superior quality" rules) and § 51.315(c)-(f) (unbundling rules). **Any issue the merits of which this court did not address in its initial opinion because of its ruling on the jurisdictional issue(s) must be separately and individually identified and argued in the supplemental briefs, or the issue will be deemed waived.** The joint brief of the Petitioners and the joint brief of the Intervenors in support of the Petitioners together are limited to a combined length of 28,000 words to be divided amongst the parties as they may agree.

b. Monday, August 16, 1999

The opening joint brief of the FCC and the United States (Federal Respondents) is due, limited to 28,000 words. A single joint brief by Intervenors in support of the Federal Respondents is also due, limited to 14,000 words divided among those Intervenors as they may agree.

c. Tuesday, August 31, 1999

Reply Briefs from the Petitioners and their supporting Intervenors are due, not to exceed 14,000 words total to be divided among those parties as they may agree. Petitioners shall file a joint reply brief, and the Intervenors in support of the Petitioners shall file a joint reply brief.

d. Friday, September 17, 1999

Oral argument is set for **8:30 a.m., Friday, September 17, 1999,** in **St. Louis, Missouri** under the following time limitations: 45 minutes opening argument for the Petitioners and the Intervenors in Support of the Petitioners to be divided among themselves as the parties may agree; 45 minutes

argument time for the Federal Respondents and the Intervenors in Support of the Federal Respondents to be divided among themselves as the parties may agree; 20 minutes rebuttal time for the Petitioners.

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court;

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.